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The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species
PETER W. THORNTON*
"[Q]uestions as to the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not
mere details of procedure, but go to the very heart of a federal
system and affect the allocation of power between the United States
and the several states."' *
The above statement is particularly true of the eleventh amend-
ment, and the tension between strong nationalist and state philoso-
phies of government remains as real today as when the amendment
was adopted in 1798. Its adoption was a measure then deemed nec-
essary to protect the states from what was thought to be a serious
threat to their continued existence and stability. The amendment
simply provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
The premise of this article is that the Constitution as originally
drafted did not recognize state sovereign immunity from suit in
federal courts, and that the eleventh amendment is narrow in scope
and limits judicial power only where the sole basis of jurisdiction is
the character of the parties.
The case of Chisholm v. Georgia2 was seen as a threat to the
sovereign immunity of the states and was the catalytic event which
produced the eleventh amendment. It was an action against the
state, initiated in the Supreme Court by the executor of a deceased
South Carolina merchant who had sold war supplies to Georgia. The
state contended that, as a sovereign, it was immune from suit with-
out its consent. The Supreme Court held that article III of the
Constitution extended the judicial power to a case against a state
by a citizen of another state or by an alien, and that this grant of
power to the national government was binding onthe states.
The reaction in Congress was swift. Two days after the decision
was announced, a resolution was introduced in the Senate proposing
a constitutional amendment which was almost identical to the one
actually passed by both branches of Congress and ratified by the
correct number of states within two years thereafter.'
* A.B. 1939, Brooklyn College; J.D. 1941, LL.M. 1969, Brooklyn Law School; LL.D. 1977,
Nova University. Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
' C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoumRS 205 (3d ed. 1976).
2 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 64-67 (1972).
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One reason traditionally assigned for the speed and for the near
unanimity in the adoption of the eleventh amendment was the fi-
nancial position of the states. Largely as a consequence of the war
they had accumulated substantial debts to both foreign and domes-
tic creditors, and some had circulated new paper money as a pain-
less way of meeting their obligations.' Historians and courts have
viewed the amendment as a means of avoiding the states' obliga-
tions to pay those debts, particularly those owing to Tory and Bri-
tish creditors.'
Another traditional view is that the motivation in adopting the
amendment was to correct what was considered as the error made
by the Court in Chisholm with respect to the scope of the judicial
power, and to thus reaffirm the "general understanding" existing at
the time that the Constitution was ratified, to the effect that the
states had sovereign immunity and could not be sued without their
consent.'
The pertinent Constitutional provision is article Ill, which defines
the judicial power and lists as one of the headlands of coverage,
"controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State
. and between a State . . . and foreign . . . Citizens."
' Id. at 8.
Chief Justice Marshall said:
It is part of our history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the States
were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prose-
cuted in the federal Courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument.
Suits were instituted; and the court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was
general; and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so extensively entertained,
this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State legisla-
tures. That its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the
degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal
of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not
comprehend controversies betwein two or more States, or between a State and
a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases, and in
these a State may still be sued. We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some
other cause than the dignity of a State. There is no difficulty in finding this
cause. Those who were inhibited from commencing a suit against a State, or
from prosecuting one which might be commenced before the adoption of the
amendment, were persons who might probably be its creditors.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821). But see C. JACOBS, supra note 3, at
69-70, who states that the national government had assumed a major portion of the states'
debts and that state governments were mostly able and willing to meet their obligations.
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Govern-
ments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1413,
1438-40 (1975), agrees with Jacobs that the states were financially able, but denies that they
were willing. He indicates that in 1794 there was great anti-British feeling and the possibility
of a war, and that even the Federalists had no political alternative but to vote for an amend-
ment that would prevent suits by Tories and British creditors against states.
' For a judicial adoption of this view, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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The validity of the traditional view that the eleventh amendment
reestablished state immunity depends on whether the somewhat
ambiguous constitutional language quoted above originally recog-
nized it. Did it extend the judicial power to all controversies be-
tween such parties regardless of whether the state is plaintiff or
defendant, or only to controversies between such parties where the
state is plaintiff'? In other words, did article III implicitly recognize
the exemption of states, as sovereigns, from unconsented suits by
individuals?
The records of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 apparently
cast no direct light on the matter, and the article, when proposed,
seemed to have occasioned no debate, and no commentary in the
correspondence of the convention delegates. 7
After the submission of the Constitution to the states for ratifica-
tion, however, the proposed judiciary article did arouse comment in
some of the state conventions. Professor Jacobs concludes that there
was no uniform agreement on the issue.' He states that the anti-
Federalists believed that the provision made a state suable as defen-
dant; that the ratifying conventions of four of the states suggested
delimiting or qualifying amendments to the proposed provision in
order to clarify that states were immune from suit; and that the
nationalists, known as Federalists, were themselves split on the
issue. Edmund Randolph and James Wilson, two of the five mem-
bers of the Committee on Detail which drafted article III, strongly
argued against sovereign immunity in the Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania conventions respectively. Randolph later was the attorney for
the plaintiff in Chisholm, while Wilson, a judge in that case, sus-
tained state suability. On the other hand, James Madison, John
Marshall, and Alexander Hamilton, in his much quoted The Feder-
alist No. 81,9 argued that a state could not be sued without its
' C. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 19, 21-22.
A Id. at 39.
It is inherent in the nature of the sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty,
is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore,
there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain
with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal . . . there is
no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of that
plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way,
free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good
faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the
conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsory force. They
confer no right to action independent of the sovereign will.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) 501, 508 (H. Lodge ed.).
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consent.
The views of these three famous men have been relied on as show-
ing a consensus on the part of the Framers that sovereign immufiity
was a doctrine inherent in article III as originally adopted." Never-
theless two of these three made inconsistent statements as well.
In deciding the case of Cohens v. Virginia," which involved the
eleventh amendment, Chief Justice John Marshall spoke of article
III as follows: "In its origin, the judicial power was extended to all
cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United States,
without respect to the parties."'12 Alexander Hamilton, in The Fed-
eralist No. 80, stated:
And if it be a just principle that every government ought to
possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own
authority, it will follow that, in order to the inviolable mainte-
nance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the
citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary
ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens
are opposed to another State or its citizens. 3
Jacobs' conclusion, based on historical analysis sketched briefly
above, is that on balance the weight of opinion was with those who
believed that article I did make a state suable by an individual
without its consent, rather than with those who believed that it
implicitly recognized state immunity. 4
Contrary to Professor Jacobs' conclusion, the traditional view is
that there was broad agreement among those who had framed and
ratified the Constitution that states were to be immune from suits
by individuals. That view of the meaning of article Ill was the basis
of judicial holdings'5 that the eleventh amendment was enacted to
, See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1890).
"19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
, Id. at 412.
" THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton) 494,.497 (H. Lodge ed.).
" C. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 40. Professor Nowak indicates that criticism of jurisdiction
in suits against states centered on the possibility of enforcement of state debts, and that none
of the attacks were directed at congressional power to grant jurisdiction to federal courts. He
suggests that Federalist No. 80 is consistent with Federalist No. 81 in that Hamilton may
have intended that only Congress have the power to grant federal court jurisdiction over cases
against states, but that the judiciary lack inherent power to assume such jurisdiction. He
states that Federalist No. 80 emphasized the need for federal court jurisdiction over national
laws, and defended jurisdiction in suits against states because of the need for the national
government to enforce the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2. This view,
Professor Nowak states, is consistent with Federalist philosophy. Nowak, supra note 5, at
1429-30.
"1 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting Hamilton's Federalist No. 81). For a
more recent discussion, see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
708 (1949).
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overrule the holding of Chisholm and to return to the pre-existing
understanding of state immunity.
As compared to the traditional interpretation that article In pre-
cluded individual actions against states in federal courts without
state consent and that the eleventh amendment restored the status
quo, the opposite view that article III conferred power to hear ac-
tions against states by individuals and that the eleventh amend-
ment is a limit on that power leaves greater room for interpretation
of the scope of the eleventh amendment.
This article will explore what has been done by later decisions.
They indicate a strong trend, though never uniform or unanimous,
to reduce the area of state protection given by the amendment.
Further, based on the belief that the amendment, whether or not
ill-conceived at the time of its adoption, has outlived its purpose,
the article will indicate several approaches, gleaned from the opin-
ions, that could be used to further reduce the size of the protective
shield of the eleventh amendment.
THE "ERROR": Chisholm v. Georgia
Each of the five members of the Chisolm Court wrote separately,
in accordance with the then existing practice of delivering opinions.
Justice Iredell's opinion appeared first, though it turned out that he
was the sole dissenter.
His opinion purported to be based on the narrow issue of whether
assumpsit might be instituted against a state by an individual,
rather than on the broad issue of whether a state may in any in-
stance be sued. Justice Iredell, however, did admit that "everything
I have to say. . . will affect every kind of suit, the object of which
is to compel the payment of money by a State."'"
The jurisdiction of the Court, he maintained, derived not from the
Constitution alone, but also required implementing congressional
legislation. After stating that every state remained a sovereign to
the extent that such sovereignty was not delegated to the United
States, and that the United States is sovereign as to all powers
surrendered to it by the states, he discussed the judicial power. That
power exists where certain parties are concerned, although the sub-
ject of the controversy is unrelated .to matters delegated to the na-
tional government, and Congress may pass laws to give the judicial
power effect. It was admitted that article HI could be interpreted
as authorizing Congress to provide for the decision of all controver-
t1 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 430 (1793).
19801
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sies in which a state is involved with an individual. However, it was
noted, the Judiciary Act, in granting the Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion of all controversies between a state and citizens of another
state, granted only concurrent jurisdiction. It was concluded that
this could only mean concurrent with the courts of the several
states, and therefore the Supreme Court could exercise no authority
but that which a state court was competent to exercise. A historical
discussion of the concept of governmental immunity from suit sup-
ported his statement that at the time of the Constitution and pas-
sage of the Judiciary Act no state authorized a compulsory suit for
recovery of money against itself in its own courts.
In what Justice Iredell himself labeled as dictum, he stated that
his present opinion was strongly against construing the Constitu-
tion, under any circumstances, as authorizing compulsive suits in
federal courts against a state for the recovery of money.
As to Justice Iredell's view that Supreme Court original jurisdic-
tion depends on implementing legislation, it is now stated as horn-
book law that the provisions of article Im concerning original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court are self-executing, and thus a direct
grant of jurisdiction, needing no implementation." Such legislation
is required, however, to confer jurisdiction on inferior courts. In
contrast to Iredell's holding that when a federal court's jurisdiction
is concurrent with a state court's, limitations on state court jurisdic-
tion necessarily limit the federal courts, the Supreme Court held in
Parden v. Terminal Railway'" that a provision in the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act for concurrent jurisdiction did not indicate
congressional intent to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
but merely provided an alternative forum in state courts.
Though Justice Iredell's opinion was stated to be based on the
absence of clear statutory implementation of article III, he noted
that the then existing Judiciary Act provided, "the Supreme Court
shall have . . . jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature...
between a State and citizens of other States, or alienis."9 The rea-
soning Iredell used to find insufficient statutory implementation
seems contrived, and the foundation of his opinion may rest in his
own self-proclaimed dictum, that the Constitution does not, under
any circumstances authorize compulsive suits against a state for the
'7 C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 556 (citing Chisholm and Kentucky v, Dennison, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 66, 96 (1860)).
- 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964). But see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1890) (admitting
that the'majority in Chisholm did not agree, but that the Court preferred Justice Iredell's
view on this point).
" 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 431.
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recovery of money. This understanding of the Iredell opinion is im-
plicit in Hans v. Louisiana,2 where the Court equated Justice Ire-
dell's view with those Hamilton expressed in The Federalist No.
81,21 and stated that the eleventh amendment, on the question of
the suability of states by individuals, shows that the highest author-
ity of this country (the people) was in accord with the minority
rather than with the majority in the decision of Chisholm.
It has been said that the separate opinions written by the majority
of four in Chisholm were based on a close observance of the letter
of the Constitution, without regard to former experience and
usage. 2 Though in one sense correct, the statement does not do
justice to the majority opinions.
In all four opinions, the justices assumed that the Constitution
directly conferred original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. It is
also true that all four of the justices in the majority pointed out that
the language of article III, "between a State and Citizens of another
State. . . and between a State. . . and foreign. . . Citizens," was
clear, and susceptible only to the interpretation that this included
any such controversy whether the state was plaintiff or defendant.
However, particularly in the opinions of Justice Wilson and Chief
Justice Jay, the history, purpose and philosophy underlying the
Constitution were carefully addressed.
Justice Wilson's opinion emphasized the fundamental philosophy
underlying the newly formed union: the people of the United States
are the sole sovereign in this country. He stated that the concept of
a government being sovereign is European in origin, is based on the
attributes of feudal tenure, and is thus alien to our Constitution
where the people have reserved the ultimate power to themselves.
The state, he said, is but an aggregate of free men, and in justice
ought to fulfill obligations just as the law binds the individuals who
make up the aggregate. The people created a national government
and gave it certain powers, thereby intending to bind the states; one
of these was the judicial power set forth in article IlI.
Chief Justice Jay agreed basically with these fundamental con-
cepts to the effect that the sovereignty of the British Crown, upon
the Declaration of Independence, passed to the people as sovereigns
of all the country. He called the Constitution a compact by the
people to govern themselves in a certain manner, and stated that it
transferred many prerogatives to the national government, intend-
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
22 Id. at 12-14.
21 Id. at 19.
19801
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ing to bind the States.
He expressed the view that suability is not incompatible with
state sovereignty, to the extent that the latter exists. He reasoned
that the state is but an aggregate of persons, and asked, if an indi-
vidual can sue the corporation of Philadelphia, why may he not sue
the state of Delaware? He stated that clearly one state is suable by
another state, and that fact alone proves that suability and state
sovereignty are not incompatible. These views were, as Chief Justice
Jay's opinion points out, generally believed, though not unani-
mously held.
After finding that the Constitution extended judicial power to the
instant case, he expressed his personal view on the wisdom of such
provision. This statement bears repetition. It states beliefs basic to
our democracy.
The extension of the judiciary power of the United States to
such controversies appears to me to be wise, because it is honest,
and because it is useful. It is honest, because it provides for
doing justice without respect of persons, and by securing indi-
vidual citizens as well as states, in their respective rights, per-
forms the promise which every free government makes to every
free citizen, of equal justice and protection. It is useful, because
it is honest, because it leaves not even the most obscure and
friendless citizen without means of obtaining justice from a
neighboring state; because it obviates occasions of quarrels be-
tween states on account of the claims of their respective citizens;
because it recognizes and strongly rests on this great moral
truth, that justice is the same whether due from one man or a
million, or from a million to one man; because it teaches and
greatly appreciates the value of our free republican national
government, which places all our citizens on an equal footing,
and enables each and every of them to obtain justice without
any danger of being overborne by the weight and number of
their opponents; and because it brings into action and enforces
this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sover-
eign of this country, and consequently that fellow citizens and
joint sovereigns cannot be degraded, by appearing with each
other in their own courts to have their controversies determined.
The people have reason to prize and rejoice in such valuable
privileges; and they ought not to forget, that nothing but the
free course of constitutional law and government can ensure the
continuance and enjoyment of them.?
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793).
[Vol. 55:293
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THE "ERROR" CORRECTED: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The judicial opinion which is famous for holding that the eleventh
amendment corrected the error of Chisholm, and which restored the
original "general understanding" that the Judiciary Article implic-
itly recognized state sovereign immunity, is Hans v. Louisiana.
2
The case involved an action on a debt, in the form of interest
coupons on bonds, brought against the state. The complaint alleged
that a state constitutional provision repudiated the coupons, and
that the state by adopting the provision had thereby impaired the
validity of contract in violation of article I section 10 of the Consti-
tution. Plaintiff was a citizen of Louisiana. The state excepted on
the ground that it could not be sued without its consent. Both the
trial court and the Supreme Court agreed.
The question posed was whether a citizen could sue his own state
upon a suggestion that the case arose under the Constitution. 
2
Plaintiff argued that a case "arising under" is within the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts without regard to parties, and that a state
can claim no immunity.
This argument does not seem to do violence to early views on the
subject. It should be noted that one of the fears of the states' rights
group was that the states might be forced by the federal courts to
pay their'debts.5 In his famous Federalist No. 81, which was quoted
in Hans, Hamilton stated that some feared that the Constitution
would enable suits against states on public securities issued by the
states. In response to that fear, Hamilton noted that by the adoption
of the Constitution state governments were not divested of the privi-
lege of paying their debts in their own way, and that contracts with
an individual are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign?
Additionally, it is important to note that even Justice Iredell's dis-
sent in Chisholm considered only whether a state was suable by an
individual for debt.2
21 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
21 Plaintiff relied on article I and on the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) which
granted jurisdiction to the circuit courts, using the same language. Note, however, there was
no general federal question jurisdiction until the Act of 1875 except for a one-year period from
1801-02. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 n.14 (1974). The present successor is 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). As to the "suggestion" that this particular case arose under the Consti-
tution, the case would not seem to meet the test as stated in the cases. Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Albright v.
Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1883).
21 See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) 501, 508 (H. Lodge ed.).
" 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 430.
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Had plaintiff's cause of action been one directly created by federal
statute or the Constitution, his argument would have been stronger,
and he clearly would have been supported by the reasoning of Chief
Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia.2 9 In fact, the suit was an
action on debt, a breach of contract. Nevertheless, the Court spoke
of the case as one "arising under" the Constitution. It then cited
Louisiana v. Jumel,3" Hagood v. Southern3' and In re Ayers,32 which
like Hans all involved actions on debt, for the proposition that a
state cannot be sued by a citizen of another state or of a foreign state
on the mere ground that the-case is one "arising under" the Federal
Constitution or federal laws. 3 Following those authorities, the Court
held that the action was precluded by the eleventh amendment.
Plaintiff contended that because he was a citizen of Louisiana the
action was not precluded by the eleventh amendment.34 The Court
admitted that the language of the amendment did not cover the
plaintiff, but concluded that it would be anomalous if a citizen
could sue his own state and a non-citizen could not. The mere
thought of this anomaly shocked the Court, which stated that such
a result would be no less startling than was the dqcision of Chisholm
v. Georgia.35 The Court then discussed the Chisholm case.
Chisholm, it said, created such a shock that it produced the elev-
enth amendment, the effect of which was to overrule the Chisholm
opinion. The amendment showed that the people of the United
States were in accord with Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm,
which held that the Constitution did not intend to create new and
unheard of remedies by subjecting sovereign states to actions by
individuals. The Constitution only authorized Congress to invest
the federal courts with jurisdiction to hear controversies between
specified parties, and properly susceptible to litigation in courts.36
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan disagreed with the
Court's comments about the Chisholm case. He said that they were
not necessary to the opinion and stated that Chisholm was based
on a sound interpretation of the Constitution at that time.3 7 His
" 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821).
107 U.S. 711 (1882).
31 117 U.S. 52 (1886).
32 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
" 134 U.S. at 10.
Plaintiff had very clear statements of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens precisely stating
the law to be as he argued, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383, but the Court in Hans called those
statements dictum. 134 U.S. at 20.
31 Id. at 11.
36 Id. at 12.
37 Id. at 21 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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view, contrary to the majority holding that article III implicitly
recognized the state's sovereign immunity from suit in the federal
courts, leaves article Ill as interpreted in Chisholm, except to the
extent that the eleventh amendment limited the judicial power
therein defined. This view leaves open the question as to what limits
were imposed by the amendment.
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT ELASTICITY AND
SOME QUALMS ABOUT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Article III reads, "The judicial power shall extend to. . . ... The
eleventh amendment reads, "The Judicial Power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to. . ." The parallel lan-
guage indicates that the latter is jurisdictional in nature, and the
decision in Hans indicates that Congress cannot grant federal courts
jurisdiction precluded by the eleventh amendment. Edelman v.
Jordan31 treated the eleventh amendment as jurisdictional, holding
that it was not waived by failure to raise it in the trial court, but
could be raised for the first time on appeal.39 The courts have not
viewed the jurisdictional language as binding."
A major departure from the jurisdictional nature of the amend-
ment is the state's right to waive its eleventh amendment defense.4
This right is contrary to the basic rule that parties cannot confer
jurisdiction on a federal court by mutual agreement, nor by any
concept of waiver or estoppel. 2 Justice Brennan, in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Department,4 3 clearly expressed the concep-
tual problem.
The literal wording is thus a flat prohibition against the fed-
eral judiciary's entertainment of suits against even a consenting
State brought by citizens of another State or by aliens .... It
is true that cases since decided have said that the federal courts
do have power to entertain suits against consenting states. None
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
' "[Tihe Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdic-
tional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court. . . ." Id. at 678.
11 Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. CoLo. L. REv. 139, 147 (1977).
Mr. Baker noted that the jurisdictional nature of the eleventh amendment is strained and
that the courts have not felt bound by the precise language of the amendment.
11 Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
42 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Knee v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 293 F.
Supp. 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
"3 411 U.S. 279, 310 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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has yet offered, however, a persuasively principled explanation
for that conclusion in the face of the wording of the Amendment.
The Court has refused to expand the language of the amendment
to cover suits against a state by the United States or by another
state. In United States v. Texas, "1 the Court stated that the perman-
ence of the union might be endangered if there were no tribunal
authorized to settle controversies between the United States and a
state. A suit by the United States against a state was.held not to
infringe state sovereignty because it was based on state consent,
which was given when the state was admitted to the union upon an
equal footing with the other states. Similarly, in Kansas v.
Colorado,5 the Supreme Court held that a state may be sued by
another state of the union, and in Monaco v. Mississippi, that such
jurisdiction is inherent in the Constitutional plan. 6
However, as discussed in Monaco the amendment's limiting effect
on the judicial power has been expanded beyond its precise lan-
guage in some instances. Hans47 is the prime example. It held that
a suit against a state by one of its own citizens is precluded. The
Court believed that it would be incongruous if the amendment were
construed to permit such suits while prohibiting suits by citizens of
another state or by aliens. Similarly, in Smith v. Reeves," when an
action was brought by a federally created corporation, based on the
argument that plaintiff was not a citizen of a state and thus not
precluded by the amendment, the Court rejected the argument,
relying on 'the Hans case.
In Monaco v. Mississippi," initiated in the Supreme Court, the
plaintiff, a foreign state, sued on bonds issued by Mississippi. Plain-
tiff relied on both the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to deter-
mine controversies between a state and a foreign state, conferred by
article III, and the argument that jurisdiction was not prohibited by
the eleventh amendment. The Court expressed its view that neither
the meaning of article III nor that of the eleventh amendment rests
merely upon the words used. It said,
Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates
which limit and control .... There is also the postulate that
" 143 U.S. 621, 643-46 (1892).
43 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907).
46 292 U.S. 313 (1934). "The waiver or consent, on the part of a State, which inheres in the
acceptance of the constitutional plan, runs to the other States who have likewise accepted
that plan, and to the United States as the sovereign which the Constitution creates." Id. at
330.
4" 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
4' 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
4: 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
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the States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sover-
.eignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save
where there has been "a surrender of this immunity in the plan
of the convention." The Federalist, No. 81. 0
After discussing and quoting Hans at great length, the Court con-
cluded that there was no surrender of immunity which would dis-
pense with the need for a state to consent to be sued by a foreign
state.
The Hans and Monaco cases are permeated with the concept of
sovereign immunity. Both indicate that article III and the elev-
enth amendment implicitly embrace the immunity doctrine and
they merge the amendment with the doctrine of sovereign immun-
ity, save where there has been a '.surrender in the plan of the con-
vention." It appears that this merger of the eleventh amendment
and the doctrine of sovereign immunity5l" explains why, though ordi-
narily jurisdiction cannot be waived, a state may waive the eleventh
amendment. This concept was borrowed from the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity.5 2
Professor Jacobs states that the rationale underlying the doctrine
of sovereign immunity has not been thoroughly discussed by the
courts, and he suggests that the historical basis as stated by Justice
Iredell in his dissent in Chisholm is the most persuasive. 53 It is
difficult to dispute that the doctrine was recognized by the states
as a part of the common law. However, the majority opinions in
Chisholm suggest the thought that Justice Iredell himself may have
overlooked the history, circumstances and purposes underlying the
adoption of the Constitution. Both Justice Wilson and Chief Justice
Jay eloquently explained that the surrender of sovereign immunity
by the states was essential to give effect to the grand purposes of
the Constitution, the giving of iberty and justice to all.
While the eleventh amendment overruled the holding of
Chisholm, the rationale underlying the majority opinion did not die.
The tension" between the view that states should be accountable in
" Id. at 322 (footnotes omitted).
51 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("the Eleventh Amendment and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies").
52 See Baker, supra note 40, at 154, 158.
" C. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 150-53.
" The tension was stated in Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903).
The Constitution of the United States, with the several amendments thereof,
must be regarded as one instrument, all of whose provisions are to be deemed
of equal validity. It would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the immunity of the
individual States from suits by citizens of other States, provided for in the
Eleventh Amendment, were to be interpreted as nullifying those other provi-
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federal courts for injury caused by breach of federal rights, and the
view that states are sovereign and should be immune from suit,
continues as strong as ever.
From judicial statements and those of commentators, it appears
that the concept of sovereign immunity has lost much of its popular-
ity. Justice Frankfurter assayed the situation as follows: "In varying
degrees, at different times, the momentum of the historic doctrine
is arrested or deflected by an unexpressed feeling that governmental
immunity runs counter to prevailing notions of reason and justice.
Legal concepts are then found available to give effect to this feeling
* , ,s 5'In the same opinion he also stated: "'Sovereign immunity'
carries an august sound. But very recently we recognized that the
doctrine is in 'disfavor'.""6 He then quoted the following language
from his dissenting opinion in Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read:
Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the monarch-
ial privilege, or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on
abstract logical grounds, see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 349, it undoubtedly runs counter to modem democratic
notions of the moral responsibility of the State. Accordingly,
courts reflect a strong legislative momentum in their tendency
to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to confirm
Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago, that "it is a
wholesome sight to see 'the Crown' sued and answering for its
torts." 3 Maitland, Collected Papers, 263.11
Justice Brennan in Employees v. Missouri Public Health
Department stated:
In a nation whose ultimate sovereign is the people and not
government, a doctrine premised upon kingship-or, as has
been suggested, "on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends," Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907)-is indefensible .... 58
sions which confer power on Congress ... which provisions existed before the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which still exist, and which would be
nullified and made of no effect, if the judicial power of the United States could
not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the passage of state laws disregard-
ing these constitutional limitations .... On the other hand, the judicial power
of the United States has not infrequently been exercised in securing to the
several States, in proper cases, the immunity intended by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.
Id. at 543.
" Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 709 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 723 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
57 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
411 U.S. 279, 311 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Professor Jacobs states that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
is "by practically any standard, morally indefensible in a modern
society,"" and suggests that it is, "as the Court has more than once
intimated, an unfortunate excrescence of a political and legal order
which no longer enlists support." 0
On the other hand, some judicial statements emphasize the im-
portance of the immunity doctrine. Justice Rehnquist in Edelman
v. Jordan, spoke of "the important constitutional principle embod-
ied in the eleventh amendment,"6 and in Quern v. Jordan2 he
referred to "the importance of the States' traditional sovereign
immunity."63
Two recent cases have been called frontal assaults on the doctrine
of sovereign immunity."4 In Nevada v. Hall," the Supreme Court
refused to hold that the Constitution implicitly recognizes a state's
sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of a sister state. The
California courts rendered a civil judgment in favor of a California
resident against Nevada in a tort action arising out of a motor
vehicle collision in California. The vehicle was owned by the state
of Nevada and was driven by an employee of the state on official
business. The California Supreme Court held that as a matter of
California law, the state of Nevada was amenable to suit. It denied
Nevada's request that the action be dismissed or that the judgment
be limited to $25,000 pursuant to Nevada's statutory waiver of sov-
ereign immunity in its own courts. The case was one of first impres-
sion in the Supreme Court. Nevada argued that, despite the absence
of an express constitutional provision, the understanding prevalent
when the Constitution was framed (that no sovereign is amenable
to suit without its consent) was implicit in the Constitution. The
" C. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 159.
" Id. at 160.
11 415 U.S. 651, 666 (1974).
,2 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1146 (1979).
63 The Supreme Court of Maine, discussing suit in its own courts, said:
The immunity of the sovereign from suit is one of the highest attributes inherent
in the nature of sovereignty. Accordingly, the large majority of jurisdictions hold
it necessary that the sovereign's consent to be sued be given by the Legislature,
as the only appropriate body to speak in this regard on behalf of the sovereign.
In the absence of specific authority conferred by an enactment of the Legisla-
ture, therefore, the sovereign's immunity from suit cannot be waived through
the imposition of procedural requirements or be deemed forfeited by procedural
defaults. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662
(1974)(other citations deleted).
Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 543 (Me. 1978).
" Speiser, Inroads on Sovereign Immunity, NAT'L L.J. 20 (July 30, 1979).
" 99 S. Ct. 1182 (1979).
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Court stated that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is an amalgam
of two concepts, one applicable to suits in the sovereign's own courts
and the other to suits in the courts of another sovereign.
The former, as it developed at common law, had roots in the
feudal system. No lord could be sued by a vassal in his own court,
but each lord was subject to suit in the court of a higher lord. There
was no lord above the King, and thus no court in which he could be
sued. This system, and the fiction that the King could do no wrong,
was stated to be the basis of the King's immunity from suit without
consent. In the United States the fiction was rejected and immunity
was based on the ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority tht makes the law on which the right depends. That
ground, however, is no support for a claim of immunity from suit
in another sovereign's court. Such immunity depends on the law of
the other sovereign.
Nevada claimed that California was not free to apply its own
laws, but was bound by a federal rule, implicit in the Constitution,
to recognize the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it existed when
the Constitution was adopted. The Court found that the framers'
concern with sovereign immunity dealt only with suits against
states in federal court, not suits in the courts of another state, and
that neither article III nor the eleventh amendment provide any
basis, explicit or implicit, to limit the powers of the California court.
Nevada claimed that the full faith and credit clause required
California to respect Nevada's waiver statute, which only consents
to suits in Nevada courts, and only for a limited amount. However,
the Supreme Court held that the full faith and credit clause does
not require a state to apply another state's law in violation of its own
legitimate public policy. Here the Court found that California had
a substantial interest in providing full protection to persons injured
on California highways, whether by residents or by non-residents.
In implementation of that interest California has completely waived
its own immunity. This substantial interest was held to justify Cali-
fornia's refusal to be bound by the Nevada statute.
Nevada further argued that the Constitution implicitly estab-
lished a union which reciprocally obligated each state to respect the
sovereignty of the others. The Court listed specific constitutional
limitations on state sovereignty as demonstrating that we do not
have a union of wholly independent states, but found nothing that
implied that a state's immunity from suit in another state is any-
thing but a matter of comity. The Court observed that the tenth
amendment, which reserves to the states those powers not delegated
to the federal government, suggests caution in concluding that un-
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stated limitations on state power were intended. California has
adopted a policy of full compensation for injuries on its highways,
and nothing in the Constitution, said the Court, authorizes or obli-
gates frustration of that policy out of enforced respect for the sover-
eignty of Nevada. It said that a holding so limiting California would
intrude on the sovereignty of the states, and the power of the people,
in our union.
Both dissenting opinions would find a constitutional basis for
immunity. Justice Blackmun would find that a guaranty to each
state of immunity from suit in the courts of another state is implied
as an essential component of federalism. He believes that the deci-
sion will place severe strains on our system of cooperative federal-
ism. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the eleventh amendment is
built on the postulate that states are not amenable to suit in the
courts of a sister state witout consent. Otherwise, he states, the
peculiar result is that states cannot be sued by citizens of another
state in the neutral federal forum, but can be sued in the courts of
sister states.
In Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona,6 the Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit found that the eleventh amendment did not protect a state
from suit for copyright infringement by use of plaintiff's song for the
promotion of its state fair. The court found that the Copyright Act
of 190967 did, by the use of the plrase "any person", authorize suit
against a class of defendants which includes states. This intent was
based on the sweeping language of the statute; on the fact that the
statute is a comprehensive regulation; and on the additional fact
that, by statute, the United States is liable for infringement. It was
then determined that the copyright and patent clause,8 was a spe-
cific grant of constitutional power to legislate to effectuate the
clause. The clause, it held, contains inherent limitations on state
sovereignty, abrogating a state's eleventh amendment immunity,
preventing a state from nullifying rights created by a statute en-
acted pursuant to the clause.69
" 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
'7 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35.Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215
(1976)).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
, In respect to the modem trend against, sovereign immunity in other areas, see the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (providing that
immunity of foreign states shall be decided by the United States courts rather than the
executive branch, and dispensing with immunity in actions based on commercial activity or
on tort). See also Comment, Avoiding the Eleventh Amendment: A Survey of Escape Devices,
1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 625, 644 (stating that in regard to suits against a state in its own courts,
the trend in the recent years has been for state courts and legislatures to abolish or severely
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Similar to the Mills case is Peel v. Florida Department of
Transportation.70 There the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit
held that the eleventh amendment did not preclude an action
against a state for reinstatement as an employee and compensation
for lost wages and benefits for dismissal contrary to the Veteran's
Reemployment Rights Act.71 The statute was interpreted to show
congressional intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity of
the states and to authorize an action for both types of relief. The
Act was within the legitimate scope of the war power. When Con-
gress acts under an article I, section 8 delegated power, it has the
authority to provide for federal court enforcement of private damage
actions against states.
The above cases illustrate the subordination of the concept of
state sovereign immunity from suit without its consent to the princi-
ple of state accountability for its wrongs. The Hall case, having no
relationship to federal courts or the enforcement of federal rights,
is very far-reaching. It will no doubt have reverberations, and may
well become a cause celebre.
This article will now explore the cases to see to what extent the
principle of state accountability has developed in the federal courts,
rendering the states amenable to suit for invasion of Federal Consti-
tutional and statutory rights. It is a complex body of law, which has
eroded much of the protective shield of the eleventh amendment.12
LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Fiction of the Individual Defendant
Ex parte Young7 was a major landmark in the lengthy struggle
between the ideal of enforceability of federal rights at the federal
trial court level and the concept of state immunity from suit in the
federal courts. Through a simple fiction it greatly limited the scope
of the eleventh amendment.
Minnesota had enacted a law reducing railroad rates. Railroad
limit the doctrine of sovereign immunity). Note also that bills have been introduced in
Congress proposing to amend the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), to allow private
causes of action against states for violation of federally created rights. See Nowak, supra note
5, at 1422, referring to H.R. REP. No. 10,049 and H.R. REP. No. 10,304, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1974).
70 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
71 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1976).
72 See Comment, supra, note 69, at 644.
73 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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stockholders sued in federal court to enjoin their companies from
complying, claiming that despite confiscatory rates the severe crim-
inal penalties for noncompliance would induce compliance. The
Attorney General of Minnesota was made a defendant, and a pre-
liminary injunction restrained him from enforcing compliance in the
state courts. Nevertheless, the next day the Attorney General
sought mandamus in a state court to compel the railroads to comply
with the statute. The district court found him in contempt. His
application to the Supreme Court for habeas corpus raised the ques-
tion whether the district court lacked jurisdiction on the ground
that the injunction was issued in an action against the state of
Minnesota.
The Court found that the eleventh amendment did not apply
because there was no action against the state. It refused to pass on
whether the fourteenth amendment in any way altered or limited
the effect of the earlier eleventh amendment.74 The Court noted that
the Osborn v. United States Bank 5 holding that the amendment
applied only to suits in which the state was a party on the record,
was expanded by Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo71 to a case where
a state officer was sued officially for moneys in the state treasury,
and by Hagood v. Southern77 to a case where the relief was in sub-
stance specific performance of a contract made by the state, but
held these cases not to be applicable..
The lever to lift the eleventh amendment bar, to justify jurisdic-
tion of federal actions against state officials and to enjoin them from
enforcing unconstitutional state statutes, was the fiction that such
an action is not one against the state, but against the state officer
in his individual capacity.
The clearest explanation is in the court's own language:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if
it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconsti-
tutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding with-
out the authority of and one which does not affect the State in
its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act
upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the
name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is
void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attor-
ney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Consti-
tution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes-
Id. at 150.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 846, 857 (1824).
,' 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 122-23 (1828).
117 U.S. 52, 67 (1886).
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into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution,
and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of
his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him
any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of
the United States. 78
Justice Harlan dissented. It would be difficult to dispute the force
of his argument that the suit was in reality one against the state and
deprived the state of the right to enforce its own statutes in its own
courts.79 A more sovereign function would be difficult to imagine
than enforcement of state statutes in state courts.
Professor Wright made the observation that the fiction has its
own illogic because the enforcement of the statute by the Attorney
General is treated as state action for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment and individual wrongdoing for purposes of the eleventh
amendment. He further disclosed the irony that when the case was
decided on the merits, the statute was sustained. Therefore, the
Attorney General was not enforcing an unconstitutional statute; he
was not stripped of state authority; and the federal suit was in
actuality one against the state, though the ultimate outcome did not
defeat the jurisdiction invoked by the complaint."
The majority obviously knew what it was doing. Like all legal
fictions, this one was adopted with a particular end in view. The
purpose was to provide federal court protection for constitutional
rights against state invasion at the trial court level, rather than
relegate the injured party to the state courts, with possible review
in the Supreme Court. The result permits greater speed and effi-
ciency in enforcing federal rights, and provides the benefit of a
federal court's role in fact findings."
" Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1886).
7, Id. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Of course, the Court well knew that the attorney general was still attorney
general while he was enforcing the statute, and the Court well knew that the
effect of enjoining the attorney general was to enjoin the state from carrying out
the unconstitutional statute. From that day to this the false pretense made by
the Court in Ex parte Young has been the mainstay in challenging governmental
action through suits for injunctions and declaratory judgments.
Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. Cin. L. REv.
435, 437 (1962) (footnote omitted). See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 699 (1978), where the
Court stated: "their injunctive suit against prison officials was, for all practical purposes,
brought against the State."
" C. WRiGHT, supra note 1, at 208.
" More recently, in a different context, the Court stated:
It is true that, after ... rejection of his federal claims by the state courts, a
litigant could seek direct review in this Court .... But such review, even when
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Ex parte Young greatly altered the relations between the nation
and the states. Federal power to restrain state officers from enforc-
ing unconstitutional state statutes subjected states to restrictions of
the Constitution that they might otherwise safely ignore. The fiction
of the individual defendant permitted the use of injunctive relief to
compel states to honor their constitutional obligations. 2
The Court has stated3 that "[a] 'storm of controversy' raged in
the wake of Ex parte Young." Professor Jacobs stated: "[T]he
antagonism engendered by suits against officers was intense, verg-
ing, in one instance, it was said, upon open rebellion. The outcry
was reminiscent of that following the decision of Chisholm v.
Georgia. "8"
The outcry was muted by legislation requiring the convening of a
three judge court to decide an action seeking injunctive relief
against the enforcement of a state statute on the ground of unconsti-
tutionality."5
A later statute softening the blow was the Johnson Act of 1934,6
which deprived district courts of the power to enjoin enforcement
of state administrative orders affecting rates chargeable by public
utilities unless, among other things, there is no plain, speedy and
efficient remedy in the state courts.
A similar statute, The Tax Injunction Act of 1937,11 deprived
available by appeal rather than only by discretionary writ of certiorari, is an
inadequate substitute for the initial District Court determination. . . to which
the litigant is entitled in the federal courts. This is true as to issues of law; it is
especially true as to issues of fact. Limiting the litigant to review here would
deny him the benefit of a federal trial court's role in constructing a record and
making fact findings. How the facts are found will often dictate the decision of
federal claims. "It is the typical, not the rare, case in which constitutional
claims turn upon the resolution of contested factual issues." Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 312.
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964).
52 "Had this fiction been pressed to its logical conclusion, it may well be that sovereign
immunity would have been practically reduced to an exemption from suit eo nomine." C.
JAcOBS, supra note 3, at 149.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 465 (1974).
C. JAcOBS, supra note 3, at 146.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281 (1976) (§ 2281 was repealed in 1976). The theory was to provide
a court of greater dignity, with three judges, one of them a circuit court judge; to require
notice to the governor and attorney general before hearing the request for a preliminary
injunction; and for direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Because of the drain on federal
judicial manpower and the mandatory nature of Supreme Court review, in 1976 the three
judge court requirement was practically abolished, see 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976), remaining
only for malapportionment cases and where provided by other act of Congress. The latter
covers certain cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
See [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 3168; C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 214.
' 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). Note that this covers the facts of Ex parte Young.
s' 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
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district courts of the power to enjoin the assessment, levy or collec-
tion of state taxes where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy is
available in the state courts.
Ex parte Young was based on a strong nationalist belief that the
Constitution provides for the primacy of the federal judiciary in
deciding questions of federal law, and on impatience with the elev-
enth amendment. The Three Judge Court Act when extant88 did not
diminish the power of federal courts to act under Young, but only
required that the power be exercised within a particular procedural
format. The Johnson Act and the Tax Injunction Act limited the
courts' power to enjoin, but they applied only within narrow
spheres. Thus, these statutory limitations left the Ex Parte Young
doctrine substantially unimpaired.
Later attempts to limit federal court injunctions restraining the
enforcement of state statutes were judicial not legislative, and did
not involve jurisdiction. They are court made rules of self restraint,
based on the avoidance of needless friction with state courts, and
concepts of "Our Federalism."89
One such judicial limitation is the Younger v. Harris" abstention
doctrine, which developed in response to a case in which federal
injunctive relief was sought to prevent state officials from further
prosecution of pending state criminal proceedings under an uncon-
stitutional state statute. The doctrine has the vital consideration of
"Our Federalism" as its basis. If the federal plaintiff can raise his
constitutional ground in the pending state litigation, federal injunc-
tive and declaratory relief will be withheld absent a showing of great
and immediate irreparable injury. The defense of a single state
prosecution brought in good faith is not sufficient. It must appear
that the defendants are acting in bad faith and for the purpose of
harrassment, or that the statute is flagrantly and patently violative
of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph, or that other unusual circumstances are present.9'
The Younger doctrine is a practical limitation on the use of the
Ex parte Young power. That power had emerged as a potent force
" See supra note 85.
" This has been described in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), as a
vital consideration, the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union
of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
:0 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
, See generally id. at 47-54.
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in the civil rights area. Following the Civil War, a pervasive sense
of nationalism led to the Civil Rights Act of 1871,92 and Mitchum
v. Foster93 held that the Civil Rights Act is an "expressly author-
ized" exception to the anti-injunction statute,94 and authorizes, in
appropriate cases, injunctive relief against ongoing state litigation."
However, the limitation of the Younger doctrine only applies to
state criminal prosecutions and to civil proceedings by the state
brought to vindicate important state policies."9 The Younger doc-
trine is a doctrine of comity and discretion. It recognizes that the
judicial power, as determined in Ex parte Young, authorizes injunc-
tions against state officers enforcing unconstitutional state statutes,
despite the eleventh amendment. 7
The Waiver Cases
A state's immunity from suit has been said to be rooted in "the
inherent nature of sovereignty."" However, the immunity may be
waived; a state is not protected from a suit to which it has con-
sented."
Parden v. Terminal Railway"0 purports to apply the waiver doc-
trine. The Terminal Railway, consisting of about fifty miles of
tracks, was wholly owned and operated by Alabama, for profit, and
it conducted substantial operations in interstate commerce. An in-
jured employee sued Alabama in federal court on a cause of action
created by the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA). 01 The
,1 Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1971) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)). See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
" 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
11 Id. at 243. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
407 U.S. at 242.
" Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
17 For a good discussion of the Younger doctrine, see Developments in the Law: Section
1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1274-1330 (1977); in respect to its application
to collateral claims see Federal Courts-Younger Doctrine, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1212 (1977).
" Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 22 U.S. 47, 51 (1944).
" Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436, 447 (1883).
'0 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
"1 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976), provides: "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in
commerce between any of the several States . . . shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce," and 45 U.S.C. § 56
(1972), provides: "Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the
United States."
19801
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
state moved to dismiss on the ground that it had not waived its
sovereign immunity from suit. The Supreme Court held that the
motion must be denied.
The Court stated that state immunity is not divested merely be-
cause the case arises under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, citing Hans,'0 but noted that in Hans the action was a
contractual one, where the federal question of impairment of obliga-
tion of contract lurked in the background. It said that a suit, as in
Hans, on a state debt obligation, without the state's consent, was
precisely the "evil" against which the eleventh amendment was
directed.1 3 It contrasted the instant suit as brought upon a cause of
action expressly created by Congress, and posed two questions.
First, did Congress in enacting the FELA intend to subject a state
to suit? Second, did it have the power to do so, as against the state's
claim of immunity?
The majority answered the first question affirmatively by point-
ing to the language in the statute, "every common carrier," to the
legislative history and to earlier cases holding that similarly worded
statutes, viz. the Safety Appliance Act and the Railway Labor Act,
applied to state owned railroads. ' "'
The second question was also answered affirmatively, although
the conceptual basis is not crystal clear. First, the Court dealt with
the doctrine of state surrender of sovereignty by the grant of powers
to Congress. Specifically it stated that the states surrendered a
portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power
to regulate commerce. 05 After quoting Gibbons v. Ogden' and
United States v. California°7 the Court stated:
By empowering Congress to regulate commerce, then, the
States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty
11 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
377 U.S. at 187.
"u Id. at 188. The Court cites United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) and Califor-
nia v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957). But see the dissent in Parden which states: "It should not
be easily inferred that Congress, in legislating pursuant to one article of the Constitution,
intended to effect an automatic and compulsory waiver of rights arising under another." 377
U.S. at 198 (White, J., dissenting). It was stated that an express declaration that a state
would be deemed to waive by undertaking regulable conduct was necessary.
"I Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
'" "This power, like all others vested in Congress is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitu-
tion. . . the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specific objects, is plenary as to those
objects. . . ." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
"' A state's operation of a railroad in interstate commerce "must be in subordination to
the power to regulate interstate commerce. . . . The sovereign power of the states is neces-
sarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the
Constitution." 297 U.S. at 183-84.
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that would stand in the way of such regulation. Since imposition
of the FELA right of action upon interstate railroads is within
the congressional regulatory power, it must follow that applica-
tion of the Act to such a railroad cannot be precluded by sover-
eign immunity.' 8
This would seem, in and of itself, a sufficiently strong basis on which
to deny state immunity. Of course, it is an action by an individual,
and the eleventh amendment as expanded by Hans to suits by a
citizen of the same state, must be considered. One might have ex-
pected the Court to conclude its discussion by stating that the elev-
enth amendment does not afford a state protection from suit where,
in accordance with the plan of the convention, sovereignty has been
surrendered by the states.09 Instead, the Court stated that recogni-
tion of power to make a state suable under the FELA doesn't mean
that the eleventh amendment is overridden; the state may not be
sued by an individual without its consent.
Consent was found because Congress conditioned the right to'
operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to suit
in a federal court as provided in the statute. By thereafter operating
a railroad in interstate commerce Alabama "must be taken to have"
accepted that condition and thus have consented to suit. Alabama
argued that under its constitution and case law, the state could not
be made a defendant in any court, and that no one had the authority
to waive this immunity. However, the Court found the ordinary rule
that waiver is a question of intent and is resolved by state law to be
inapposite. It held that the question of waiver is one of federal law
whenever it is asserted to arise from state action within the realm
of congressional regulation.
The theory that the state consented seems contrived. In the view
of the four dissenters, it appears to be an automatic and compulsory
"waiver," neither knowing nor intelligent."0 The source of the con-
sent theory apparently was Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Commission. " That case involved a suit against a bi-state authority
'' 377 U.S. at 192.
10 See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 299 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan had previously authored the Parden decision. "Parden held that
a federal court determination of such suits cannot be precluded by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity because the States surrendered their sovereignty to that extent when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce." Id. at 299.
I' 377 U.S. 184,200 (White, J., dissenting). See Field, The Eleventh Amendment and other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 1203, 1209-10, 1214-15 (1978). See Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070,
1081 (5th Cir. 1979), where the court viewed the requirement of consent as unnecessary and
viewed compelled consent as fiction.
"' 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
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whose creation required congressional consent pursuant to the com-
pact clause of the Constitution. In approving it, Congress attached
a proviso which was construed as a condition of amenability to suit
in the federal courts. It took some ingenuity to transfer the condition
concept from that contractual context to the FELA."2 It may be
that the consent theory was. used in Parden as a convenient way to
avoid a direct answer to tlepremise of Alabama that Congress lacks
power to directly strip a state 6f' its sovereign immunity. The closing
portion of the opinion is interesting, the last sentence being,
"Where, as here, Congres's by the terms and purposes of its enact-
ment has given no indication that it desires to be . . .hindered in
the exercise of its constitutional power, we see nothing in the Consti-
tution. to obstruct its will."''
Employees v. Missouri Public Health Department,"4 the second
of the waiver cases, refused to read Parden as holding that sovereign
immunity carnot preclude a federally created cause of action be-
cause 'the states surrendered their sovereignty when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce. Instead, it deemed that
state consent, based on operating the railroad, was an essential part
of the Parden holding."5
In the Employees case, state employees sued the state for over-
time compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)," 6
which expressly covers employees in state hospitals, institutions or
schools. The central issue was whether Parden was distinguishable.
The court found that it was. Unlike the FELA involved in Parden,
the FLSA did not authorize suits by individuals against a state. The
Court found nothing in the legislative history of the statute to indi-
cate congressional intent that individuals could sue a staTe, and
pointed to provisions authorizing the secretary of labor to sue a state
for restitution in behalf of state employees. Absence of clear intent
to authorize individual suits was the basis for the decision. 1 7
112 The Court in Petty emphasized that it was "called on to interpret not
unilateral state action but the terms of a consensual agreement" between the
States and Congress, id., at 279, and held that the States who join such a
consensual agreement "by accepting it and acting under it assume the condi-
tions that Congress under the Constitution attached."
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 696 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3 377 U.S. at 198.
411 U.S. at 279 (1973).
Id. at 280-81 n.1. Note, however, that the Court's finding that in enacting the FLSA
Congress did not intend to subject states to suits by individuals in federal courts, makes this
discussion of Parden's consent requirement unnecessary to the opinion. Id. at 285.
"' Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 16b, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 216b (1976)).
"I Discussion at 411 U.S. 286-87 could be taken to mean that if Congress had clearly
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Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, found that Congress
did intend to subject states to suit by individuals. He also found,
however, that the state did not consent. He believed that the choice
of either ceasing operation of vital public service or "consenting" to
federal suit showed that there was no true choice. Therefore, he
agreed that the eleventh amendment precluded suit in federal court.
He noted however that the FLSA authorized suit to be brought in
any court of competent jurisdiction. He then stated, citing Testa v.
Katt, 18 that while individuals could not. enforce their FLSA action
against a state in federal court, they could do so in a state court
because of the constitutional obligation of state courts, under the
supremacy clause, to enforce federally created causes of action, even
if they conflict with state policy.
Despite Justice Brennan's comment that it is paradoxical to con-
clude that a state can frustrate vindication of federal rights in fed-
eral court, but not in its own courts,"' Justice Marshall's suggestion
is an ingenious approach that would sharply reduce state immunity,
and would permit the enforcement of federally created causes of
action against states, thus indirectly limiting the eleventh amend-
ment. Of course, in Testa v. Katt, which is the basis of this idea,
the state was not required to hear an action in its own courts against
itself. Would Testa stretch as far as Justice Marshall suggested in
a situation where the state had eleventh amendment immunity
from suit in the federal court?
Justice Brennan's dissent in the Employees case was the most
interesting of the opinions. He also believed that the intent to allow
individual suits against states was clear both from the text of the
statute and its legislative history; he then discussed his view of the
eleventh amendment. He stated that there was an ancient doctrine
authorized individual suits against states it would have lifted sovereign immunity (no discus-
sion of consent here). Additionally, the Court stated: "The question is whether Congress has
brought the States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit in a federal court."
Id. at 283.
"A 330 U.S. 386 (1947). But see Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 546 (Me. 1978), where the
Maine Supreme Court held that an action in the state court for money due under a federal-
state aid program under the Social Security Act was not justified by a statute waiving state
immunity from tort liability, stating:
It is not plausible to believe that the Legislature's authorization of the State's
participation as a partner with the federal government in the AABD program
allowed the State's immunity (as protected by the 11th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States) to continue as against actions brought in the
federal courts for monies claimed past due under the AABD program, Edelman
u. Jordan, supra, but yet simultaneously waived the State's immunity as against
suits to impose such a liability which are brought in the courts of the State.
", 411 U.S. at 316.
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of sovereign immunity that existed before the Constitution. He fur-
ther stated that there was a surrender of that immunity to the
extent that enumerated powers were granted to the national govern-
ment, because effective exercise of such enumerated powers re-
quired state surrender of immunity to empower Congress, where
necessary, to subject states to suit. There was no surrender in regard
to prohibitions imposed by the states on themselves, such as the
contract clause, which is not an enumerated power, and as to which
the states granted Congress no power of enforcement by means of
subjecting the states to suit or otherwise. He rejected the view that
Hans extended the coverage of the eleventh amendment to suits
against a state brought by its own citizen.'20 He believed that in
Hans the state was protected by the non-constitutional ancient doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, which was not waived in respect to the
contract clause action. This approach is based on that of Chief
Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 2' who said that the eleventh
amendment did not bar a federal-question suit brought against a
state by its own citizen. Marshall's view was that article In ex-
tended judicial power to all federal question controversies regardless
of the litigants, and that the eleventh amendment expressly with-
drew such power only as to suits against states by citizens of other
states or by aliens.
Thus, Justice Brennan would hold, on the Employees facts, that
as a citizen sued his own state, the eleventh amendment was irrele-
vant; as Congress had provided for suit against states under an
enumerated power, the commerce power, the states had surrendered
their ancient sovereign immunity; and that in such cases no consent
is necessary.' 22
,I" Id. at 298 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 662, which
said: "While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own
citizens, this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." See also
415 U.S. at 663: "The Court of Appeals in this case, while recognizing that the Hans line of
cases permitted the State to raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to a suit by its own
citizens, nevertheless .... "
"1 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821).
'2 The last point, i.e., the absence of need for consent, seems inconsistent with Justice
Brennan's opinion in Parden which emphasized consent; however, there he was faced with
the Hans opinion which is generally viewed as having held that the eleventh amendment did
apply to a suit against a state by its own citizens, and he had to obviate that hurdle with the
concept of consent. Here, he is expressing his own view, not that of the Court. For Brennan's
description of the Parden holding which does not include consent as an element, see 411 U.S.
at 279.
Note that even though Congress does act under an enumerated power, its regulation will
be ineffective if it impairs the states' integrity, or their ability to function effectively in a
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This approach bears close watching. It has a kind of inexorable
logic despite the apparently incongruous result that in Employees
the state would have been suable by its own citizen but not by a
citizen of another state. However, the probabilities are great that
the vast majority of state employees desiring to sue the state under
the FLSA would be state citizens.
Justice Brennan's interpretation certainly would be a major step
in restricting the scope of eleventh amendment immunity.
Edelman v. Jordan, 2 the last of the trilogy of consent cases, like
the majority opinion in Employees, never really had to discuss the
concept of consent.
This was a class action against state officials of Illinois who were
allegedly administering federal-state programs of Aid to the Aged,
Blind, or Disabled (AABD) in a manner inconsistent with federal
regulations and the fourteenth amendment. Under the Social Secu-
rity Act the program was funded by the state and federal govern-
ments. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare had is-
sued regulations prescribing time limits for processing applications.
Defendants were operating pursuant to Illinois regulations. The
complaint alleged that the federal time limits were not being fol-
lowed, and that grants were improperly commenced in the month
in which the application was approved, without including prior eli-
gibility months. The district court declared the Illinois regulations
invalid insofar as contrary to the federal regulations, granted an
injunction requiringfuture compliance with federal regulations, and
ordered the state officials to release AABD payments wrongfully
withheld. On appeal, the officials contended that the eleventh
amendment barred the retroactive benefits. The Supreme Court
agreed and reversed that portion of the order directing payment of
retroactive benefits.
The Court held that when the action is for recovery of money from
the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and can
invoke sovereign immunity; if the liability must be paid from public
funds in the state treasury, suit is barred by the eleventh amend-
ment. Despite the argument that the award was in the nature of
federal system. Such violation of state sovereignty, reserved to the states by the tenth amend-
ment, would be in excess of Congress' constitutional power. National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
In Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) the court stated: "In
determining whether the congressional action violates the limitations of the tenth amend-
ment, we must assess and weigh the source of the congressional power and the legitimacy of
its exercise against the degree to which it interferes with integral governmental functions of
the states and political subdivisions." Id. at 1083.
1- 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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equitable restitution and justified by Ex parte Young' the Court
stated that not all equitable relief can be justified by Young. The
relief there was prospective only. Here the relief was retrospective
in nature, being compensation for past breaches of legal duty. The
funds would not come out of the pockets of the officials, but must
inevitably come from the general revenues of the state. It is not easy
to demarcate permissible from impermissible relief. The injunction
in Young was not without effect on state revenues, and later cases12
have prohibited the denial or termination of welfare benefits. But
in those cases the consequences to state treasuries resulted from
.compliance with injunctions prospective in nature, and were thus
ancillary to permissible relief.
The Coirt refused to find that the state had waived its eleventh
amendment protection by participating in the AABD program.
There clearly was no evidence of voluntary intentional waiver by the
state. Constructive consent is not ordinarily sufficient for surrender
of constitutional rights and, it was said, the mere participation in a
federal program which aids the state's public aid system is not
enough. The only possibility was waiver under federal law based on
the Parden'26 rule which turns on whether Congress intended to
abrogate state immunity and whether the state, by participation,
had in effect consented thereto. Here, the Court stated, the thresh-
old fact of congressional intent, or as the opinion phrased it, authori-
zation to sue a class which literally includes states, was lacking. The
only language in the Social Security Act purporting to provide a
sanction against a participating state for nonconformity to federal
law was the termination of future allocation of federal funds.
The decision in Edelman thus, like that in Employees, never
reached the question of what kind of activity by the state could be
viewed or considered as consent under the Parden rule, because the
basic predicate, i.e., a finding that Congress intended, within the
ambit of its constitutional power, to create state liability in federal
courts, was absent.
The dissent by Justice Douglas took a practical approach.
Whether, in a welfare case, the decree is only prospective or requires
payments for skipped periods, the nature of the impact on the state
treasury is precisely the same, and he points to Supreme Court cases
which affirmed judgments of the latter type. 2 7
124 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
'12 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
121 See note 18 & accompanying text supra.
'2 Among others he cited Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Note that in the
majority opinion the Court stated that the Shapiro case was of precedential value on this
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Justice Brennan's dissent reiterated his views in Employees'2 8 to
the effect that the eleventh amendment had no application to a suit
against a state by its own citizen, and that as the Social Security
Act was enacted pursuant to article I, an enumerated power, the
states surrendered their ancient sovereign immunity.
Probably the most important result of the Edelman opinion was
the impetus it gave to the concept that prospective relief is -valid,
even though it necessarily requires expenditures out of the state
treasury, provided that they are ancillary to the prospective relief.
This is illustrated by the decision in Milliken v. Bradley.' The
district court found de jure segregation in Detroit schools and made
a desegregation order which included a requirement that specified
remedial educational programs be instituted for school children who
had been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation. The district
court directed that the additional cost of the new programs be paid
equally by the Detroit School Board and the state defendants (the
State Board of Education, the Governor, and the Attorney General).
The court of appeals affirmed. The state defendants appealed from
the remedial part of the order and from the state's obligation to pay
part of its costs. The Supreme Court found the remedial order war-
ranted. It also held that the eleventh amendment was not violated,
relying on Edelman, despite the argument that the order was indis-
tinguishable from an award of money damages based on asserted
prior misconduct of state officials. The decree to share future costs
of the remedial programs was held to fit within the prospective
compliance exception, reaffirmed in Edelman, which had its genesis
in Ex parte Young, 30 permitting federal courts to enjoin state offi-
cials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law despite
a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury. The Court
pointed out that the programs are part of a plan which operates
prospectively. It noted that there was no monetary award to plain-
tiffs, and that the case did not involve individual citizens conduct-
ing a raid on the state treasury for an accrued monetary liability.
To emphasize the impact on the state treasury Justice Powell's
concurring opinion stated that the state was ordered to pay about
$5,800,000.
point, but expressly disapproved Shapiro's eleventh amendment holding to the extent that
it was inconsistent with the instant opinion, not feeling obliged to follow stare decisis because
the Court was dealing with a constitutional question.
' 411 U.S. 279, 310 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22 433 U.S. 267 (1977). See also New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 596
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1979); Kimble -v. Soloman, 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979).
'3 See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
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Statutory Implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer'1 was a class action on behalf of present and
retired employees of the state of Connecticut against state officials
of Connecticut. The plaintiffs alleged that provisions in the state
statutory retirement plan discriminated against them because of
sex, in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title VII was amended in 1972 to include state governments as
employers within the statutory coverage. The district court held
that the state statute violated Title VII and granted prospective
injunctive relief. Petitioners also sought an award of retroactive
retirement benefits for losses caused by the discrimination. It is
clear from the language of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII that
Congress intended to authorize a private suit for backpay by state
employees against the state. Nevertheless, the district court and the
court of appeals both held that under the eleventh amendment and
the decision in Edelman v. Jordan the federal action for retroactive
damages was not constitutionally permissible.1 12
The Supreme Court, finding the retroactive award constitutional,
distinguished Edelman. It reasoned as follows: Edelman held that
an award of monetary relief to welfare plaintiffs for earlier wrong-
fully denied benefits violated the eleventh amendment; Edelman
further held that the doctrine of waiver expounded in Parden'3 was
inapplicable because the necessary predicate for that doctrine was
congressional intent to abrogate state immunity and no such intent
was found in the statutes relied on by plaintiffs.
Here, the Court held, there was no doubt that the retroactive
benefits were indistinguishable from those sought in Edelman.
However, the predicate of congressional intent to authorize individ-
ual suit against the state was clearly present.
The Court then indicated its awareness of the factual differences
between the states activity of operating a railway in Parden, which
was viewed as consent, and that involved in the present case. This
suggests that the Court might have found it difficult to base waiver
on state conduct which was governmental in nature, but the Court
did not consider the question of consent. It proceeded upon an alter-
native ground. It noted that the power of Congress involved in
Parden was based on the commerce clause, but that here the legisla-
tion was passed pursuant to Congress' authority under section 5 of
131 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
2 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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the fourteenth amendment.' 34
Relying on the much earlier case of Ex parte Virginia, 135 the Court
reasoned that the fourteenth amendment, ratified by the states
after the Civil War, clearly contemplates limitations on state sover-
eignty. The substantive provisions are expressly directed at the
states; the provisions imposed duties on the states in respect to
private individuals; and Congress is given power to enforce the im-
peratives by appropriate legislation. All this expanded Congress'
powers, with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty. The
eleventh amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty it em-
bodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of sec-
tion 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Under section 5, the Court
stated, Congress can provide for private suits against states which
are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. The latter
would seem to be dictum, despite the strong and clear language of
the Court.
Fitzpatrick thus came up with a holding which cut 'away a large
portion of eleventh amendment protection.
It is interesting to compare Justice Brennan's opinion. He reas-
serted his view from Employees'35 that the eleventh amendment
does not bar this action, and that the ancient doctrine of sovereign
immunity does not either because immunity was surrendered inso-
far as the states granted Congress specifically enumerated powers.
Title VII, he said, is based on congressional authority in the com-
merce clause, and in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which
are two of the enumerated powers granted to Congress.
The importance of the basic holding in Fitzpatrick cannot be
overemphasized. It made clear that Congress has plenary power to
set aside state immunity from retroactive relief in order to enforce
the fourteenth amendment.
Attorney's Fees
In Hutto v. Finney, ,37 the Court dealt with the question of whether
11 Section 1 .... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section 5 . . . .The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
"' 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
M2 411 U.S. 279 (1972).
1' 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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the award of attorney's fees against a state is prohibited by the
eleventh amendment.
Litigation began ten years before the decision. The district court
found that conditions in the Arkansas penal system constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. Initially it directed the Department of Correc-
tion to start improving conditions, and to file reports. Later it issued
guidelines. For a while there seemed to be improvement and the
court ceased supervision, warning that prior decrees remained in
effect and that sanctions, costs and attorney's fees would be im-
posed for violations. Thereafter it found that conditions had deterio-
rated. The court ordered specific remedial steps. It also found that
petitioners had acted in bad faith and awarded counsel "a fee of
$20,000.00 to be paid out of [the] Department of Correction
funds. 138 The court of appeals affirmed and assessed the state an
additional $2,500 to cover the fees and expenses of appeal. The
Supreme Court sustained both provisions over the objections of the
eleventh amendment.
As to the district court award, it was based on a finding that
petitioners acted in bad faith. The Court restated the Ex parte
Young' 9 power to grant prospective injunctive relief against state
officers, and the Edelman'4 ° holding that the eleventh amendment
grants a state immunity from retroactive monetary relief, but not
from costs of compliance ancillary to a prospective order, and
pointed out that the difference is not always clear. On the instant
facts, the Court found the attorney's fees to be ancillary.
The theory was that when granting a prospective injunction the
court need not merely hope for compliance. Contempt may be pun-
ished by imprisonment or fine, and civil contempt may result in a
remedial fine, compensating the opponent. If state officers disobey
an order, it was stated that the principles of federalism surely do
not require enforcement by sending high ranking state officials to
jail. The less intrusive fine is ancillary to the power to impose in-
junctive relief. Here the award of attorney's fees for bad faith served
the same purpose as a remedial fine imposed for civil contempt.
Compensation was not the sole motive. The award vindicated the
court's authority and induced further compliance. Thus the award
was ancillary to the prospective order made earlier and violated in
bad faith.
' Id. at 685.
See notes 73-78 & accompanying text supra.
,' See notes 123-28 & accompanying text supra.
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As to the court of appeals award, it was not based on any finding
of bad faith, but on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976.11 The Court, cited Fitzpatrick' for the proposition that Con-
gress has plenary power to set aside the state's immunity from retro-
active relief in order to enforce the fourteenth amendment. It then
found that when the Fees Awards Act was passed, Congress un-
doubtedly intended to use that power and to authorize fee awards
payable by the state when their officials are sued in their official
capacities. Intent was found from the broad language "in any ac-
tion" to enforce certain laws; from the fact that the covered laws
were specifically passed to restrain state action; and from the clear
legislative history which contemplated state liability for attorney
fees.
The Attorney General argued that this was not enough; that Con-
gress must use express language in order to abrogate state immun-
ity. The Court gave several answers. First, unlike Edelman, this
case did not concern retroactive liability for prelitigation conduct,
but expenses incurred by plaintiff in seeking only prospective relief.
Thus, attorney's fees were ancillary to prospective relief within the
meaning of the Edelman rule. Second, it was said that the Act
imposes attorney's fees as a part of costs, and the Court has never
viewed the eleventh amendment as barring such awards, even in
suits between states and individual litigants, because of the inher-
ent power of a court in the orderly administration of justice between
litigants. It said it was too late to single out attorney's fees as the
one kind of litigation cost whose recovery cannot be authorized by
Congress without an express waiver of state immunity. Third, the
Court said that whatever degree of clarity of expression might be
required in a case like Employees, where the statute was based on
an article I power, here the statute was based on the enforcement
provision of the fourteenth amendment. Applying a "standard ap-
propriate" to such a case, the Court found the statute clear enough
to authorize attorney's fees.
"1 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), provides that in suits under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976), and certain other statutes, federal courts may award prevailing parties reasona-
ble attorney's fees "as part of the costs."
112 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871
Municipal Liability
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,'4 3 the Supreme Court
expressly overruled the decision of Monroe v. Pape,'" which held
that local governments were wholly immune from suit under The
Civil Rights Act of 1871.'45 The Court in Monell expressly disavowed
that it was addressing the question of state liability under section
1983.1 Therefore, Monell does not directly affect the eleventh
amendment. Nevertheless, the holding is closely related to the
thrust of this article.
The Monroe Court concluded that on the basis of legislative his-
tory Congress did not intend municipal corporations to be within
the definition of "persons" subject to liability under section 1983.' 7
In Monell, the Court made a fresh and detailed analysis of the
debates on the proposed statute, and of the case law which each side
mustered in its support. It reached the conclusion that Congress did
intend municipalities and other local government units to be within
the coverage of section 1983.148
This interpretation permits suits directly against local govern-
mental bodies for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief where
the alleged unconstitutional activity implements or executes a pol-
icy statement, an ordinance, a regulation, or a decision officially
adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.'49 Moreover,
though the touchstone of action against a government body is that
official policy be responsible for a deprivation of constitutional
,4 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
" Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
"I "Our holding today is, of course, limited to local government units which are not consid-
ered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes." 436 U.S. at 690 n.54.
" 365 U.S. at 191.
"' 436 U.S. at 690. The Court by its holding cleared what had become a quagmire of
conflicting lower court authority on the question as to which state boards and agencies might
be viewed as "persons," and whether an officer might be proceeded against individually or
officially. See Smith & Singer, Limitations on Federal Judicial Power in Civil Rights Cases:
"Persons," Eleventh Amendment, Immunities, Vicarious Liability, 14 WAKE FoREsT L. REv.
711, 712-13 (1978).
"' 436 U.S. at 690.
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rights, like every other "person" local governments may be sued for
constitutional deprivations pursuant to governmental "custom,"
even though such custom has not received formal approval through
the body's official decision making channels.""
A clear limitation on the scope of section 1983 was made, however,
by the further holding that it does not authorize municipal liability
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.' 5' The Court stated
that the section itself compels the conclusion that municipalities
were not to be held liable unless action pursuant to official policy
of some nature caused a constitutional tort. The government, under
color of some official policy, must cause an employee to commit the
wrongful act. A municipality cannot be held liable vicariously solely"
on the basis of an employer-employee relationship with the tortfea-
sor.' 5- The Court made it clear, however, that it did not address
the question of what the full contours of municipal liability under
section 1983 might be, preferring to leave that to another day.
Prior to Monell, while Monroe still precluded the bringing of civil
rights actions against municipalities under section 1983, a number
of cases dealt with the question whether actions against municipali-
ties could be based directly on the fourteenth amendment relying
on the principle utilized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,'53 thus circumventing section
1983 and its restrictive definition of "person."
In Bivens, the Court sustained a complaint for damages against
individual federal agents who, acting in the name of the United
States under color of official authority, violated plaintiff's fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court held that although the fourth amendment does not spe-
cifically provide for an award of money damages, it is well settled
that where federally protected rights have been invaded, courts will
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.'54
The courts disagreed about whether a direct cause of action could
be based on the fourteenth amendment. Some circuits declined to
infer a cause of action based directly on the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' 5 Some said the issue was a open ques-
tion.'56 Other circuits inferred a direct cause of action from the four-
' Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 691.
's Id. at 692.
"= 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
's' Id. at 396.
' Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977).
"' Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978).
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teenth amendment on the basis of Bivens.'5 These latter circuits
justified an action against a municipality under the general federal
question statute, 28 U.S.C. 1331, rather than section 1983. They,
however, drew the line by holding that such direct cause cannot be
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. They required that the
municipality itself be culpable. Turpin v. Mailet, 58 decided one day
before Monell, relied on the Bivens holding, stating that its intend-
ment was that only those directly responsible for unconstitutional
behavior may be called to task for their wrongful course of conduct.
Jones v. City of Memphis, was decided after Monell, and in its
holding on respondeat superior relied directly on Monell, believing
that it would be incongruous to hold that the doctrine of respondeat
superior can be invoked against a municipal corporation under sec-
tion 1331, when it clearly has no application in an action under
section 1983.' '1 This holding, which appears eminently logical, for-
closes the possibility that an implied direct cause of action based
on the fourteenth amendment can give broader possibilities of re-
covery against a municipality than those provided by section 1983.60
An interesting district court opinion, Naughton v. Bevilacqua,'6'
dealt with the liability of a state which by statute had waived its
sovereign immunity with regard to suits in both state and federal
court.1 2 The court held that regardless of the waiver, the state would
not be subject to suit either under 1983 (even if the statutory waiver
authorized a 1983 suit), or under an implied cause of action, solely
on the doctrine of respondeat superior. It said that the question
paralleled that of municipal liability, and that it was not enough
that the state is merely the employer of offending officials, but that
"I Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1230
(1979); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom., City of West Haven v.
Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 586 (1978), modified, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979).
In Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979), the Supreme Court inferred a cause of action
directly from the due process clause of the fifth amendment based on sex discrimination in
termination of employment, in favor of an employee of a federal congressman who, not being
in the competitive service, was not within the coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Whether the same result would be reached in regard to the fourteenth amendment is
uncertain. The fact that it is state power sought to be restrained, that a remedy exists under
1983 against the officer, and now against the local governmental body might suggest other-
wise. See Smith & Singer, supra note 148, at 718-19.
's' 579 F.2d at 164.
,' 586 F.2d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1230 (1979).
,' See Case Comment, Judicial Refusal to Imply a Cause of Action Against Municipality
Under Fourteenth Amendment After Monell, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1150 (1979), which
suggests legislation amending 1983 to include actions against municipalities based on respon-
deat superior.
' 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978).
,, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-1 (Supp. 1978).
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it must itself have caused the injury.
Given the preceding cases, there remains one open question con-
cerning federal suits against municipalities based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior. In a section 1983 civil rights action against
municipal employees, in a state whose law provides that local gov-
ernments lack sovereign immunity, and provides for vicarious liabil-
ity for the tortious conduct of municipal employees, may a state law
respondeat superior claim against the municipality be entertained
under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine of United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs?'63 The Supreme Court in Aldinger v. Howard,'4 a case de-
cided at a time when section 1983 did not permit suits against
municipalities, refused pendent party jurisdiction (that is, jurisdic-
tion over a non-federal, claim against a defendant other than the
defendant against whom the federal claim is interposed) of the
claim against the municipality grounded in state law because the
principal claim was based on section 1983, which then excluded
municipalities.'65 It held that congressional exclusion could not be
circumvented by bringing the municipality back on the ground of
the common fact basis of both claims.'66 Now, of course, a munici-
pality can be sued under section 1983, but not if the only theory is
vicarious liability. The question posed is whether the reasoning of
Aldinger will be applicable. The answer is likely to be yes. It might
be held that section 1983 excludes vicarious liability claims against
municipalities, and that to permit the municipality to be brought
in as a pendent party on such claims would be violative of congres-
sional intent.
State Liability
Justice Brennan stated, in his concurring opinion in Hutto v.
Finney, that "it is surely at least an open question whether §1983
properly construed does not make the States liable for relief of all
kinds, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment."'6 7 Later, in a
separate opinion in Quern v. Jordan, 6 joined by Justice Marshall,
he took the firm stand that section 1983 does permit actions against
states, in federal court, even for retroactive monetary relief.
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
" 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
'u Id. at 16-17.
"' Id.; see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (pendent party
concept).
1" 437 U.S. 678, 703 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
1,3 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1149 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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His conclusion was founded on the Fitzpatrick holding that Con-
gress can, by legislation enacted under section 5, the enforcement
provision of the fourteenth amendment, provide for private suits
against states,' 9 and the enactment of section 1983 under section
5.70 He then found that a state was intended to be included within
the words "every person" used to describe the class of prospective
defendants in section 1983.' M The conclusion followed that state
immunity under the eleventh amendment was abrogated by section
1983.72
He noted that Edelman held that section 1983 did not abrogate
state immunity. However, that holding was based on the then exist-
ing view that section 1983 was not intended to include municipal
corporations and therefore, could not have been intended to include
states as parties defendant.7 Edelman's premise, however, was
undercut by Monell'74 which reversed earlier law, and interpreted
section 1983 to include municipalities.
In finding the congressional intent to include states in section
1983, Justice Brennan relied on several factors. First, the historical
context of section 1983 is that it was adopted shortly after the Civil
War, in 1871, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment, which are directed at the states themselves.
Second, the plain meaning of the language "any persons" is shown
by the Dictionary Act, 175 which provided that in construing statutes
the word "person" shall be applied to "bodies politic and corporate"
unless the context shows that a more limited meaning was intended,
and that at that time the phrase "bodies politic and corporate" was
understood to include governmental bodies, both local and state.
Third, the legislative history, evidenced in detail by statements
made in debates surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act,
shows the intent of Congress to protect personal rights as against the
states themselves. 76
Justice Brennan's view seems to have been repudiated by lan-
guage in the majority opinion in Quern. 171 There, the Court pointed
out that the Monell case, which interpreted section 1983 to cover
municipalities, expressly limited the holding to "local governmental
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
7, See Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1150 n.3 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring).
'' Id. at 1154.
,72 Id. at 1150.
173 Id.
2 See note 146 supra.
For judicial discussion of this act, see Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1145 (1979).
Id. at 1152-58 (Brennan, J., concurring).
177 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979).
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units. . . not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment
purposes."'' 8 Further, after Monell, the Court decided Alabama v.
Pugh,"9 which was said to dispel any doubt on the question by
holding that, in an action based on section 1983, the eleventh
amendment precluded joining a state as defendant.'80 The Court
was not convinced by Justice Brennan's opinion, and believed that
neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history showed
congressional intent to abrogate state immunity.' 8'
The Quern case is a most unusual one, and is actually a sequel
to Edelman. 82 Following remand to the district court in Edelman,
defendant state officials were ordered to send a notice to members
of the plaintiff class explaining that the federal suit was at an end,
and advising that there were state administrative procedures avail-
able to obtain a state determination of their eligibility for past bene-
fits. The Court rejected the argument that such notice would lead
inexorably to payment of state funds for retroactive benefits and
therefore was, in effect, a monetary award. The notice was held to
be merely informational and the matter one for resolution by the
state.'83 The notice, the Court held, was properly viewed as
"ancillary to the prospective relief already ordered by the Court.' 84
The propriety of the notice was the only issue in the case, neverthe-
less, during the opinion, the Court answered respondent's sugges-
tion that Edelman had been undercut by Monell and that section
1983 should be held to include states.'85
Justice Brennan, though concurring in the judgment, treated the
majority discussion of section 1983 as dictum, despite the author's
protestations to the contrary. The Court's holding that the notice
was ancillary to prospective relief was sufficient to support the deci-
sion that it was not barred by the eleventh amendment, therefore
the discussion of the section 1983 issue was unnecessary to the hold-
ing. He also denied that Alabama v. Pugh held "that a State is not
a 'person' for purposes of section 1983."'' ' Pugh was an extremely
brief per curiam opinion involving a mandatory injunction to eradi-
cate cruel and unusual punishment in the Alabama prison system.
The state was a party in addition to a state board and state officers.
'17 Id. at 1144 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978)).
1' 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
,' Id. at 782.
"' 99 S. Ct. at 1145.
, Id. at 1141.
" Id. at 1142, 1148-49 (discussing Edelman).
' Id. at 1149.
' Id. at 1144-47.
" Id. at 1151 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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The question was, " [w]hether the mandatory injunction issued
against the State of Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections
violates the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity or exceeds the
jurisdiction granted federal courts by 42 U.S.C. §1983."'' 1 As Justice
Brennan noted, the Pugh opinion did not discuss section 1983. It
addressed only the question whether Alabama had consented to
being sued; found that it had not; and held that the state was not
properly made a defendant. Justice Brennan contended that the
Court decided the first half of the question, but not the second half
in respect of section 1983. "' This seems to accord with the view of
Justice Stevens. The latter, in his dissent in Alabama v. Pugh,
stated that nothing was accomplished by the case except the correc-
tion of harmless error. Though the state is striken as defendant, if
state officers disobey the injunction, financial penalties may be
imposed on the state agencies." 9 He also stated: "Surely the Court
does not intend to resolve summarily the issue [are States 'persons'
within 1983] debated by my Brothers [Brennan and Powell] in
their separate opinions in Hutto v. Finney ....
Though there may be merit in Justice Brennan's contention that
the question of the scope of section 1983 was not necessary to the
opinion in Quern, the case did say in clear language that states are
not "persons" within section 1983. It would seem unlikely that in
the near future the majority of the Court will accept the contrary
view.
Justice Brennan's interpretation of section 1983 was carefully and
logically presented, and if adopted, would shrink the contours of the
eleventh amendment close to those which Chief Justice Marshall
drew in Cohens.19t For all practical purposes, the federal judicial
power would extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, law
or treaties of the United States regardless of the parties.
It would seem, in light of the Court's statements in Quern, that
the above result might be simpler to accomplish by legislative
amendment of section 1983, than by judicial interpretation.
SUGGESTED INTERPRETATIONS
Though the divergent political philosophies of nationalism and
states-rights which existed at the time of the adoption of the Consti-
187 438 U.S. 781, 782 n.2 (1978).
' 99 S. Ct. at 1151.
438 U.S. at 782-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
,, Id. at 783 (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'91 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821).
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tution still exist, by whatever name, the economic and political
emotions that propagated the eleventh amendment have long since
dissipated. To the extent that the amendment supports the doctrine
of sovereign immunity it seems inconsistent with the fundamental
policies underlying the later Civil War amendments which "were
intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the
States and enlargements of the power of Congress;' ' 2 and equally
inconsistent with the "pervasive sense of nationalism" 9 3 underlying
the Civil Rights Act of 1871' 91 which extended protection to individ-
uals against violation, under color of state law, of rights guaranteed
by federal Constitution and law, and with the Judiciary Act of
March 3, 1875111 which conferred on lower federal courts general
federal question jurisdiction empowering them to vindicate federal
rights.
More fundamentally, the eleventh amendment is inconsistent
with the theory of article HI, as originally construed in Chisholm v.
Georgia, which neither explicitly nor implicitly recognized that
states had a sovereign right of immunity from suit in the federal
courts.' 6
Additionally, it seems to some that the eleventh amendment has
been interpreted more broadly than intended by its drafters, and
that an interpretation which precludes federal courts from vindicat-
ing federally created rights, even where a state is the transgressor,
undercuts the philosophy underlying the Constitution.' 7
Though the cases discussed above, particularly Ex parte Young' 8
through its fiction of the individual defendant, have to a large ex-
tent drained the eleventh amendment of its sovereign immunity
concept, Edelman v. Jordan has drawn a distinction between pro-
spective relief and retrospective monetary relief. Apparently the
eleventh amendment precludes the latter even though the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate federally created rights.
Believing that Edelman draws the line at the wrong place, this
article now espouses two theories, drawn from the cases, which
would redraw the line and narrow the scope of eleventh amendment
immunity.
'" Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
"' Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463 (1974).
"' Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 3 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)).
"I Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § § 1-2, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1976)).
' See notes 16-23 & accompanying text supra.
' See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 382-84 (1821).
,, See notes 73-97 & accompanying text supra.
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Citizen Suits not Precluded by the Eleventh Amendment
Justice Brennan's dissent in Employees took the position .that
Hans 9' did not extend the eleventh amendment to suits against a
state by its own citizens."' 0 He believed that the Court protected the
state against its own citizen's suit, which was based on contract, by
invoking the ancient common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
from suit without consent.2 ' A careful reading of the case indicates
this to be plausible and logical analysis.
On this view, essentially based on the opinion in Cohens,202 the
eleventh amendment only precludes suits against a state when
brought by citizens of another state or by aliens, which is exactly
what it says.
In a suit by the state defendant's own citizen the question is
whether "in the plan of the convention" the state surrendered its
immunity upon joining the Union. Justice Brennan explained the
Hans result, favorable to the state, on the ground that there was no
surrender of sovereign immunity by the states in respect to constitu-
tional limits on state power, such as the contract clause, as to which
no enforcement power was granted to Congress. Surrender, he
stated, occurred only as to the enumerated powers granted to Con-
gress in article 1.203
Thus, on this theory, the result would have been favorable to the
state in the Hans fact pattern even if the eleventh amendment had
never been adopted.'0 4
If the cause of action is based on a statute implementing an enu-
19 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
- 411 U.S. 279, 313 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 Id.
212 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
203 See notes 120-22 & accompanying text supra.
21 This view has been briefly stated in Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921), citing Hans
among other cases, as follows:
That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of
jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the Con-
stitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated deci-
sions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does
not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment;
and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule
of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.
Id. at 497 (emphasis added). See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("Even if the Eleventh Amendment does cover a citizen's suit against his own
state"-expressing doubt as to the Hans holding) (emphasis added). Stevens cited the hold-
ing in Cohens v. Virginia and Brennan's dissent from Employees.
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merated power, this theory would permit a citizen of the state to sue
while a non-citizen or alien could not. Though such result might
offend one's sense of balance, it would probably avoid the bar of the
eleventh amendment in most federal question cases; the probability
is that citizens are most likely the persons injured by state conduct.
Further, the theory does apply the eleventh amendment as clearly
written. The uneven result would not appear to be produced by
illogic in the theory, but by the drafters of the eleventh amendment,
who, though they did not so state, seemed to have had in mind only
article III jurisdiction based on the character of the parties and not
that based on the nature of the cause.
Federal Question Cases not Precluded by the Eleventh Amendment
Chief Justice Marshall wrote a stirring opinion in Cohens v.
Virginia215 clearly detailing the purpose and spirit of the Constitu-
tion as he saw it. The Constitution, definitely nationalist in concept
and origin, created a central government that had the power to
directly affect the people and to bind the states, and was designed
to cure the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. The su-
premacy clause made the Constitution, the law and the treaties of
the United States the supreme law of the land, binding on the
judges in every state. The powers ceded by the people and the states
to the federal government are limited in number, but in regard to
those powers the federal government is supreme; the sovereignty of
the states was surrendered to that extent.
The opinion involved a writ of error to a state court in Virginia,
which had convicted Cohens for selling lottery tickets in violation
of a Virginia statute. The defense was that a federal statute, which
incorporated Washington, District of Columbia, authorized it to
create a national lottery, and that the sale of the tickets was thus
justified by federal law which supersedes contrary state law.
The major point of the state's motion to dismiss the writ, for our
purposes, was that it was an action against the state brought by a
citizen of the state, and that a sovereign independent state is not
suable without its consent.
The Chief Justice, early in his opinion, characterized Virginia's
position in such a manner as to foretell its futility.
They maintain that the constitution of the United States has
provided no tribunal for the final construction of itself, or of the
laws or treaties of the nation; but that this power may be exer-
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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cised in the last resort by the Courts of every State in the Union.
That the constitution, laws, and treaties, may receive as many
constructions as there are States; and that this is not a mischief,
or, if a mischief, is irremediable.2 18
Looking first to article III, he said that it gave jurisdiction in two
classes of cases. In the first class, jurisdiction depends on the char-
acter of the cause, whoever may be the parties, and comprehends
all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, laws and
treaties of the United States. This clause extends to all such cases,
without exception and without regard to parties. In the second class,
jurisdiction depends solely on the character of the parties, and com-
prehends "controversies between two or more states, between a
state and citizens of another state," and "between a state ... , and
foreign states, citizens or subjects. '2 7 If the parties to the suit fall
within the second class the subject-matter is unimportant.218
The instant case was held to be within the first class. A case
'arises under" not only when a plaintiff comes into court to demand
something conferred on him by federal law, but may consist of a
defendant's right as well. It is enough that its correct decision de-
pends on federal law.209
The jurisdiction of the Court, he pointed out, was extended by the
letter of the Constitution to all cases "arising under" it or the laws
of the United States. It contains no exceptions. The argument is
that a sovereign independent state can't be sued without consent,
but that consent is not requisite in each particular case, and rather
may be given in a general law. Then he held that in the Constitution
the states surrendered that portion of sovereignty involving immun-
ity from suit. This holding was based on the supremacy clause and
the spirit of the Constitution, which requires that the federal gov-
ernment be capable of deciding issues arising out of its own Consti-
218 Id. at 377.
207 U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 1.
20 "[Clases between a State and one of its own citizens, do not come within
the general scope of the constitution, and were obviously never intended to be
made cognizable in the federal courts. The State tribunals might be suspected
of partiality in cases between itself or its citizens and aliens, or the citizens of
another State, but not in proceedings by a State against its own citizens. That
jealousy which might exist in the first case, could not exist in the last, and
therefore the judicial power is not extended to the last."
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 390.
211 This view continues to the present in regard to Supreme Court review of state decisions,
but as to the original jurisdiction of the district courts, the view is that a case "arises under"
when plaintiff seeks to vindicate federal rights but not when the defense is based on federal
law. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149 (1908).
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tution and laws so that the delegated powers cannot be set at naught
by variant applications or lack of enforcement in state courts. He
said, "We think a case arising under the constitution or laws of the
United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever
may be the parties to that case. '210
The Court then turned to the eleventh amendment, which it
found was adopted because of state fears that debts might be en-
forced against them in the federal courts.211 It was argued that this
writ of error was a suit commenced or prosecuted against a state.
In rejecting that argument it held that the amendment only covered
cases in which an individual makes a demand against a state in the
federal courts. Here, the case was commenced in the state court by
the state against the individual and transferred, not to make a claim
against the state, but to assert a defense against a claim made by
the state. The Court continued,
But should we in this be mistaken, the error does not affect
the case now before the Court. If this writ of error be a suit, in
the sense of the 11th amendment, it is not a suit commenced or
prosecuted "by a citizen of another State, or by a citizen or
subject of any foreign State." It is not then within the amend-
ment, but is governed entirely by the constitution as originally
framed, and we have already seen, that in its origin, the judicial
power was extended to all cases arising under the constitution
or laws of the United States, without respect to parties. 21 2
The Court then disposed of the argument that Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction cannot be exercised over the judgment of a
state court because the federal judiciary is completely foreign to
that of a state. It held that in our federal system, where the national
government is supreme to the extent of its delegated powers, such
review is essential to avoid contradiction and confusion in state
courts and to assure uniformity of interpretation of federal law. The
judicial power to entertain jurisdiction in all cases "arising under"
could not be effectively exercised without such power of review. 213
2I 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383. There can be no doubt from this powerful decision that the
Court construed article III as did the majority in Chisholm v. Georgia. It clearly held that
the article does not have implicit within it a recognition of the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity from suit, but that such rights were surrendered on joining the Union.
As to the second class of cases, i.e., those dependent on the character of the parties, there is
jurisdiction though the state is a defendant. Id. at 383-84. "The constitution gave to every
person having a claim upon a State, a right to submit his case to the Court of the nation."
Id. at 343.
211 Id. at 406.
12 Id. at 412.
211 It is interesting to note that following the strong decision supporting the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, after argument on the merits the Court found for Virginia, interpreting
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Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens is the basis of the
second theory suggested in this article, viz. that states are subject
to suit in federal courts on cases "arising under" the Federal Consti-
tution and laws, regardless of the eleventh amendment.
A reexamination of the purposes and policies underlying the Con-
stitution, of the function and scope of the eleventh amendment, and
of the cases, suggests the soundness of the theory.
It could well be concluded that the function of the eleventh
amendment was to reverse the holding of Chisholm. 214 In Chisholm
the individual plaintiff sought to enforce a contract claim against
the defendant state, and the Court found jurisdiction based on that
part of article III covering controversies between a state and citizens
of other states or of foreign states. The decision interpreted such
provision as granting jurisdiction whether the state was plaintiff or
defendant. The eleventh amendment provides that the judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to a suit
commenced against a state by a citizen of another state or of a
foreign state.
If the purpose of the eleventh amendment was to reverse the
Chisholm case, that was neatly accomplished. The fear of states
that their debts would be enforceable in federal courts"' was laid to
rest. It appears that the amendment, in effect, turned that part of
article III providing jurisdiction of all controversies between the
specified individuals and states into a one-way street, covering only
those controversies in which the state is plaintiff.
The amendment's language is broad, but there is little to suggest
that it was intended to change the article III headland of jurisdiction
covering cases "arising under" the Constitution, laws and treaties
of the United States. Suits under that headland were not then com-
monplace, as there was no general implementing statute until the
Act of March 3, 1875.
In Cohens, Chief Justice Marshall held that article Ill gave juris-
diction over all cases "arising under" regardless of whether a state
was the defendant 2l' and then found that the eleventh amendment
did not apply in that case for either of two reasons: the writ of error
was not a suit "commenced or prosecuted" against a state; or peti-
tioner was neither a citizen of another state nor a foreign state.2I7
the federal statute in question as not superseding the state statute. Id. at 440-42.
14 "This amendment . . . actually reversed the decision of the Supreme Court." Hans v.
Louisiana, 134.U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
21 See note 5 supra.
SI 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383, 391.
21 Id. at 412-13.
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The basic justification for Supreme Court jurisdiction to review
state court decisions was that without such power the Court could
not perform the important task enjoined on it by the Constitution,
that is to determine all controversies "arising under" federal law.
It would seem that the same motivation, proper performance of that
duty, should be strong enough to justify entertaining all federal
question suits at the federal trial court level rather than merely
having Supreme Court review of state court judgments, though a
state be defendant, and regardless of who is plaintiff.28
Chief Justice Marshall's view that the eleventh amendment was
limited to cases where jurisdiction is based on the character of the
parties seems clearly stated in a case decided shortly thereafter,
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 29 where he stated, "[t]he
amendment has its full effect, if the constitution be construed as it
would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the Court never
been extended to suits brought against a State, by the citizens of
another State, or by aliens."2
If the eleventh amendment were so construed, there would be no
occasion, under the present Judiciary Act, for a state to invoke the
eleventh amendment in the inferior courts because there is no stat-
ute implementing that part of article HI predicated on the character
of the parties. The amendment's function would be to preclude suits
against states by citizens of another state or by aliens in the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which suits had been allowed by
Chisholm.
An apparent major hurdle to the above suggestion is the Hans22'
case, where the specific argument made by the plaintiff was that a
state has no immunity from suit if the case arises under the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States. The Court, in clear
language held to the contrary, "That a State cannot be sued by a
citizen of another State, or of a foreign state, on the mere ground
that the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, is clearly established by the decisions of this court
in several recent cases.1 22
The court cited three cases for this proposition, Louisiana v.
Jume1,22 Hagood v. Southern, 224 and In re Ayers, 2 5 referring to them
I" According to the Court, review of state court decisions is an inadequate substitute for
federal trial court determination of federal issues. See note 81 supra.
211 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
Id. at 857-58.
"' 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Id. at 10.
107 U.S. 711 (1882).
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as cases "arising under" the Constitution, upon laws complained of
as impairing the obligation of contracts, and stating that it was not
denied that they presented cases arising under the Constitution.
The first, Jumel, was a suit on state bonds (as was the suit in
Hans) and the other two were in effect actions for specific perform-
ance of an agreement made by the state to accept state-issued scrip
and coupons in payment of taxes. In each it was claimed that the
repudiation of the state's contractual obligation was based on state
constitutional and statutory provisions violative of article I, section
10 of the Constitution, which forbids any state to pass laws impair-
ing the obligation of contracts. All three found that the actions,
though nominally against state officers, were in essence actions
against the state.
The nature of the actions in these three cases was discussed at
length in In re Ayers."2 6 The Court there held that article I, section
10 created no direct action for impairment of contract, and that no
action existed under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. It stated that
article I, section 10, so far as it can be said to confer any individual
rights, does so only indirectly. The only action for denial of a con-
tract right is by action on the contract itself. If the contract is
between individuals, a party is entitled to enforce it despite the
invalid state provision purporting to impair it, but when the con-
tract is between an individual and the state, the eleventh amend-
ment precludes an action on the contract against the state.
In Hans the plaintiff sought to recover on state-issued bond cou-
pons which had been repudiated by the same state constitutional
provision involved in Jumel.227
Justice Brennan later stated: "Such a suit on state debt obliga-
tions without the State's consent was precisely the 'evil' against
which both the Eleventh Amendment and the expanded immunity
doctrine of the Hans case were directed. '2 2
It would seem that by applying the standards of "arising under"
as presently understood, neither Hans nor the three cases on which
it relied arose under the Constitution or federal laws. The cases, as
stated above in In re Ayers, were based on contract, whose obliga-
tion had its genesis in state law. The Federal Constitution did not
create the right the plaintiff sought to vindicate; the Constitution
was raised in anticipation of the defendant's defense based on a
-4 117 U.S. 52 (1886).
225 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
221 Id. at 503-05.
22 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
21 Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964).
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state statute or constitutional provision. "9
The Hans "holding" that cases "arising under" federal law are
precluded by the eleventh amendment can be viewed as unneces-
sary to the case, as the cause involved did not arise under federal
law; the case only involved a suit to enforce a state's debt obligation.
The Court could well refuse to treat Hans as binding precedent
on this point. In Edelman,2 30 the Court said that in dealing with a
constitutional question it is less constrained by the principles of
stare decisis than in other areas of the law, and disregarded its
earlier holding that an individual was permitted to recover retroac-
tive payments from a state under a federal statute. Also, in a related
area, dealing with the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the court
in MoneU1, 23 1 showed little reluctance, upon reevaluating the mean-
ing of the statute, to overrule its prior holding that municipalities
were not subject to suit under the statute. 12
The cases decided after Hans generally conform to the theory that
the eleventh amendment does not preclude an individual from suing
a state in a federal court on a cause "arising under" federal law.2 13
The Parden Court emphasized that this was the first time a
state's immunity claim had been raised in the Supreme Court
against a cause of action expressly created by Congress.2 34 The
Parden decision purportedly is based in part on the concept of con-
sent. It appears, however, that the whole discussion of consent may
have been unnecessary to the opinion. 35 In his dissent in Employees
Justice Brennan, who wrote the Parden opinion, while discussing
22 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149 (1908); Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1882). In Gully, the Court stated: "Looking
backward we can see that the early cases were less exacting than the recent ones in respect
of some of these conditions." 299 U.S. at 113. Justice Brennan in Parden, called Hans a
commonplace suit in which the federal question did not itself give rise to the alleged cause
of action against the state but merely lurked in the background. 377 U.S. at 187 n.3. He
similarly referred to Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1899), where plaintiff sought recovery of
taxes paid under improper assessments, and Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921), an
admiralty suit for property damage due to negligence. See also Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (holding that admiralty claims do not arise
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States as that phrase is used in article
Im and in 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Brennan similarly referred to Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S.
311 (1920), a suit to restrain the state from enforcing the eighteenth amendment on the
ground that the amendment was invalid.
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
' 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2 2 See notes 143-48 & accompanying text supra.
213 Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978), may be viewed to the contrary. It is, however, a
brief per curiam opinion which only discussed the absence of consent by the state and
apparently relied on the Hans "holding." See notes 186-90 & accompanying text supra.
- 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964).
2u See notes 105-13 & accompanying text supra.
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actions under regulatory statutes founded on the commerce clause,
clearly stated Parden's rationale: "Parden held that a federal court
determination of such suits cannot be precluded by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity because the States surrendered their sover-
eignty to that extent when they granted Congress the power to regu-
late commerce. 12 36 That statement does not include the concept of
waiver by current state activity, but waiver of immunity by adop-
tion of the Constitution.
The Employees decision, which denied jurisdiction of an individ-
ual action against a state under the Fair Labor Standards Act, did
not deny that the states surrendered sovereignty when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce. The holding was based
on a finding that neither the statute nor its legislative history indi-
cated that Congress intended to authorize individual suits against
states in federal courts.237
Edelman v. Jordan238 made a distinction between prospective in-
junctive relief requiring state officers to comply with federal law,
and retroactive money awards for past wrongdoing payable out of
state funds. The latter type of relief was held to have made the
action one against the state. Though the opinion discussed consent
and waiver, jurisdiction was denied on the same basis as in
Employees. The court found that the Social Security Act's AABD
program did not disclose a congressional intent to authorize suits
against states for retroactive damages.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 2 39 went part way in holding that the eleventh
amendment does not preclude actions "arising under" federal law.
It found that the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did clearly
authorize suits for retroactive damages by individuals against states
for employment discrimination. The Court found it unnecessary to
consider the consent or waiver concept of Parden because the stat-
ute was enacted by Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, which authorizes legislation to enforce its principles.
It reasoned that the fourteenth amendment was intended to dimin-
ish state sovereignty, and that the eleventh amendment is limited
by the enforcement provision of section 5. Thus, Fitzpatrick holds
that the eleventh amendment does not preclude individual actions
against states where the cause of action "arises under" a statute
enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment.240
-- 411 U.S. 279, 299-301 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2,7 Id. at 285.
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
239 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
210 The question whether the eleventh amendment may have been limited by the later
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The Court stated that under the enforcement provision of the
fourteenth amendment Congress may provide for private suits
against states which would be constitutionally impermissible in
other contexts.2  This statement, though contrary to the view being
discussed in this article, that is, that all cases "arising under"
should be outside the eleventh amendment, was unnecessary to the
opinion. Further it seems inconsistent with the statement in Ex
parte Virginia,2 12 which the Court relied on and cited at length.
There it was said,
Nor can she [a state] deny to the general government the right
to exercise all its granted powers, though they may interfere
with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers
had not been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to
the general government involves a corresponding dimunition of
the governmental powers of the State. It is carved out of them .243
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment does not seem to be as
unique as suggested in Fitzpatrick.244 In that part of Ex parte
enacted fourteenth amendment even without statutory implementation has not been decided
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 694. Jagnandan v. Giles,
538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1976), held that the two amendments
must be balanced, and that the interests of both are supported when state officials are
enjoined from enforcing a statute which deprives plaintiff of fourteenth amendment rights,
and the states' fiscal interests are preserved under the eleventh amendment by the denial of
money damages. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer was said not to affect this in the absence of specific
legislation under section 5. Accord, Litton Indus., Inc. v. Colon, 587 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1978).
It has been stated that such legislation must expressly authorize suits against state govern-
ments as did the statute involved in Fitzpatrick. Ahmad v. Burke, 436 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Summers v. Civis, 420 F. Supp. 993 (W.D. Okla. 1976). See Yuran Jen Cuk v.
Lackner, 448 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Hoke v. Board of Medical Examiners, 445 F. Supp.
1313 (W.D. N.C. 1978). See also Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979), which held that a
cause of action and a damages remedy were implied directly under the Constitution when
the due process clause of the fifth amendment was violated.
21 427 U.S. at 456.
242 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
243 Id. at 346.
2U An express grant of power to Congress is not peculiar to the fourteenth amendment.
Such grants are contained in the thirteenth, fifteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twenty-third,
twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth amendments, and such grant is also a part of the proposed
equal rights amendment. See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom.,
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 586 (1978), modified, 591
F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979).
See Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding Arizona liable for
copyright infringement). On reasoning similar to that in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the court found
that the copyright and patent clause is a specific grant of constitutional power that contains
inherent limitations on state sovereignty. Implementing legislation is authorized by article I,
§ 8, cl. 8. Such legislation, intending to include states in the class of defendants, was held to
abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. Similarly, Peel v. Florida Dep't of
Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979), found that the state could be sued for reinstatement
and compensation for back wages for violation of the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act,
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Virginia quoted in Fitzpatrick, the Court said that were it not for
section 5, there might be room for argument that the fourteenth
amendment is only declaratory of the moral duty of the state, but
that section 5, in respect to the contents of the fourteenth amend-
ment, performed the same function that the necessary and proper
clause24'5 did in respect to the legislative powers listed in article 1.246
This point was specifically made by the Court in Katzenbach v.
Morgan.217 It was this understanding which induced Justice
Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Fitzpatrick,24 8 to state,
"[C]ongressional authority to enact the provisions of Title VII at
issue in this case is found in the Commerce Clause, Art. I. §8, cl. 3,
and in §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, two of the enumerated
powers granted Congress in the Constitution."
Hutto v. Finney,249 following the Fitzpatrick case, sustained
awards of attorney's fees against a state on the grounds that they
were ancillary to prospective relief within the meaning of Edelman20
and that they were authorized by statute enacted to implement the
fourteenth amendment.
The statement in Hans, that a state cannot be sued in a federal
court by an individual on the mere ground that the case "arises
under" the Constitution or laws of the United States,25' should no
longer be regarded as binding precedent. Fitzpatrick, despite its
language, has within it, as indicated above, the basis of a holding
that the eleventh amendment does not preclude actions against
states in federal courts if the cause of action against the state was
created by a statute implementing one of the specifically enumer-
ated powers of Congress. 252 Even more broadly, it should be held, as
Chief Justice Marshall believed, ' 3 that the eleventh amendment
38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-26 (1976), a statute which created such cause of action in an employee,
intending to abrogate the state's eleventh amendment immunity, where the statute was based
on the war power and enacted under the necessary and proper clause.
" "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
I" Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 455.
2V 384 U.S. 641 (1966). "By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a
specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed
in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 18." Id. at 650. The Court pointed out in
footnote 9 that earlier drafts of the proposed amendment employed the "necessary and
proper" terminology to describe the scope of congressional power, and that the substitution
of the "appropriate legislation" formula was not thought to diminish the scope of the power.
21 427 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2 4 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
z71 See notes 137-40 & accompanying text supra.
' See note 222 & accompanying text supra.
22 See Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1080 (5th Cir. 1979).
21 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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limited the judicial power only in respect to that portion based
solely on the character of the parties; thus it does not preclude
jurisdiction of actions "arising under" federal law even though a
state is the defendant.
CONCLUSION
The premise of this article is that the concept of sovereign im-
munity, in the sense of immunity of the states of the Union from
suit in the federal courts without their consent, was not recognized
by the Constitution as originally drawn; and that the eleventh
amendment is narrow in scope, and limits only that portion of the
judicial power set forth in article III authorizing jurisdiction over
cases based solely on the character of the parties.
The Court, realizing that an expansive interpretation of the elev-
enth amendment would make the form of government conceived by
the Framers of the Constitution unworkable, and would effectively
deprive individuals of rights created in them by Constitution or
federal statute, has reduced the area of state immunity.
The major inroad on the scope of the eleventh amendment is
based on the fiction that an action to restrain a state officer from
enforcing an unconstitutional state statute is not an action against
the state, but against the officer as an individual. This device has
developed well beyond the prohibition of future illegal conduct, to
the extent that it permits mandatory orders requiring a state,
through its officers, to perform its constitutional obligations.
Though such injunctions sometimes have vast pecuniary results to
a state, they do not violate the eleventh amendment provided that
future state expenditures are but ancillary to future compliance
with the Court's order.
Thus, the protection remaining to the states was limited to im-
munity to suits for retroactive damages. Inroads, however, have
been made even into this protected zone.
The Supreme Court has held that where Congress created a cause
of action by statute enacted to implement one of its enumerated
powers, it could condition state activity within the area of statutory
coverage on amenability to suit in the federal courts. Such condition
allows money damage actions against states which, by activity in
the area, may be said to have consented to suit.
Also, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may impose
money damages on states in the federal courts in accordance with a
statute enacted under the enforcement provision, section 5, of the
fourteenth amendment.
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This article has suggested that even greater incursions be made
by adopting the two following interpretations of the eleventh
amendment, each dealing with cases "arising under" the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties of the United States. First, interpret the elev-
enth amendment, in accordance with its terms, to preclude suits
against states by citizens of another state and by citizens of a foreign
state, but not to preclude those suits by citizens of the same state
which are within the judicial power because they arise under a fed-
eral statute implementing an enumerated power. Second, interpret
the eleventh amendment as a limitation of the judicial power set
forth in article III, only with respect to the headland based upon the
character of the parties, viz., controversies "between a State and
Citizens of another State" and "between a State . . . and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects," but not as a limitation of the judicial
power to determine cases arising under federal law, regardless of
who the parties are.
Court adoption of either of these approaches will place the con-
cept of soverign immunity from suit in federal courts close to the
position it had at the adoption of the Constitution, as interpreted
by the majority of the Supreme Court in Chisholm, and to the
position it had after the adoption of the eleventh amendment, as
interpreted by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens.
The second approach will come closer to the goal and be more
comprehensive in scope and in application because it will permit
suits against states regardless of the citizenship of the individual
plaintiff, and whether the cause arose under a statute implementing
an enumerated power, or directly under the Constitution.
If this theory is applied, the eleventh amendment will still serve
an important function. It will prevent Congress from granting juris-
diction to inferior courts and will prevent the Supreme Court from
exercising its original jurisdiction over actions against states based
solely on the ground that the plaintiff is a citizen of another state,
or of a foreign state. The eleventh amendment will then be limited
to the function for which it seems to have been originally intended.
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